fix(security): close MEDIUM ASVS findings — JWT pinning, SSE tickets, SSRF, mTLS pin, rate limits + correctness bugs
Auth (V2.1.1/V3.1.2, V2.1.3, V3.1.1): - Pin JWT iss/aud/typ at mint and require+verify them at decode; revocation (jti denylist + tokens_valid_from) still enforced. - Change-password now requires min_length=12. - SSE auth moves off JWT-in-URL to a single-use 60s opaque ticket (POST /auth/sse-ticket); raw JWT in query no longer authenticates a stream. Removed dead fail-open get_stream_user helper. Egress (V5.1.1, V9.1.1/V14.1.3): - Webhook delivery + CRUD reject SSRF destinations (private/loopback/link-local/ metadata, IPv4-mapped, multi-A-record) via resolved-IP validation, pin to the vetted IP, and never auto-follow redirects. Opt-out via DECNET_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE. - UpdaterClient pins the worker leaf cert SHA-256 against the stored per-host fingerprint (fail closed on missing/mismatch); DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME now defaults True. Hardening (V13.1.3, V4.1.4, V13.1.2): - Rate-limit change-password (5/min), enroll-bundle (10/min), webhook-create (20/min), host-delete (20/min) via the existing slowapi limiter. - Correct false 'global auth middleware' comment; document enroll-bundle proxy trust. Correctness (BUG-7..11): - BUG-7 unbound bus in finally; BUG-8 apply_ceiling clamps to min(base,ceiling); BUG-9 commit before emit; BUG-10 multi-actor rearm for sub-threshold identities; BUG-11 normalize naive timestamps to UTC. Already-closed (no change): V14.1.1, V2.1.2/V3.1.3, V5.1.2. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -18,7 +18,14 @@ import pytest
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from sqlalchemy import select
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from decnet.env import DECNET_ADMIN_USER, DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD
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from decnet.web.auth import ALGORITHM, SECRET_KEY, get_password_hash
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from decnet.web.auth import (
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ALGORITHM,
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JWT_AUDIENCE,
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JWT_ISSUER,
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JWT_TYPE,
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SECRET_KEY,
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get_password_hash,
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)
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from decnet.web.db.models import User
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from decnet.web.dependencies import repo
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@@ -54,7 +61,17 @@ def _aged_token(uuid: str, *, seconds_old: int = 30) -> str:
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change sets to 'now', so it is deterministically revoked once bumped."""
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now = int(time.time())
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return jwt.encode(
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{"uuid": uuid, "jti": f"aged-{uuid}", "iat": now - seconds_old, "exp": now + 3600},
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{
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"uuid": uuid,
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"jti": f"aged-{uuid}",
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"iat": now - seconds_old,
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"exp": now + 3600,
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# The verifier now pins issuer/audience/type (V2.1.1 / V3.1.2); a
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# manually-encoded token must carry them or decode rejects it.
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"iss": JWT_ISSUER,
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"aud": JWT_AUDIENCE,
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"typ": JWT_TYPE,
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},
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SECRET_KEY, algorithm=ALGORITHM,
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)
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ import pytest
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from hypothesis import given, strategies as st, settings
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import httpx
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from decnet.env import DECNET_ADMIN_USER, DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD
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from decnet.web.limiter import limiter as _limiter
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from ..conftest import _FUZZ_SETTINGS
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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@@ -57,6 +58,46 @@ async def test_fuzz_change_password(client: httpx.AsyncClient, old_password: str
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json=_payload,
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {_token}"}
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)
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assert _response.status_code in (200, 401, 422)
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# 400: schema-guard middleware rejects bad length/shape (e.g. a
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# new_password below the 12-char floor) before the handler runs.
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assert _response.status_code in (200, 400, 401, 422)
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except (UnicodeEncodeError, json.JSONDecodeError):
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pass
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# ─── Rate-limit enforcement ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_change_password_rate_limit_trips_after_5(client: httpx.AsyncClient) -> None:
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"""5 change-password attempts from one IP → 6th returns 429."""
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login_resp = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login",
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json={"username": DECNET_ADMIN_USER, "password": DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD},
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)
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token = login_resp.json()["access_token"]
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for i in range(5):
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r = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/change-password",
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json={"old_password": f"wrong-{i}", "new_password": "does-not-matter-x!"},
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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# 401 (bad old password) or 429 if the limiter fires — either is fine
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assert r.status_code in (401, 429), f"attempt {i}: got {r.status_code}"
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# The 6th attempt must trip the rate limiter (limit is 5/minute).
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r = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/change-password",
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json={"old_password": "still-wrong", "new_password": "does-not-matter-x!"},
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert r.status_code == 429
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_change_password_route_has_rate_limit_decorator() -> None:
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"""Contract test: change_password handler must be wrapped by slowapi."""
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from decnet.web.router.auth import api_change_pass as _mod
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assert getattr(_mod.change_password, "__wrapped__", None) is not None
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111
tests/api/auth/test_sse_ticket.py
Normal file
111
tests/api/auth/test_sse_ticket.py
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,111 @@
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# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
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"""SSE stream tickets (V3.1.1) + change-password min-length (V2.1.3).
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The ticket store is a security boundary: single-use, 60s, fail-closed. These
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cover the mint→redeem happy path, single-use reuse rejection, expiry rejection,
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the endpoint round-trip, and the V3.1.1 invariant that a raw JWT in the SSE
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query string is no longer accepted.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import httpx
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import pytest
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from fastapi import HTTPException
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from decnet.env import DECNET_ADMIN_USER, DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD
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from decnet.web.auth import create_access_token
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from decnet.web import dependencies as deps
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# ── ticket store unit tests ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def test_mint_then_redeem_happy_path() -> None:
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deps._reset_sse_tickets()
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ticket = deps.mint_sse_ticket("user-1", "viewer")
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identity = deps._redeem_sse_ticket(ticket)
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assert identity == {"uuid": "user-1", "role": "viewer"}
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def test_ticket_is_single_use() -> None:
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deps._reset_sse_tickets()
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ticket = deps.mint_sse_ticket("user-1", "admin")
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deps._redeem_sse_ticket(ticket) # first redeem consumes it
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with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
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deps._redeem_sse_ticket(ticket)
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assert exc.value.status_code == 401
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def test_unknown_ticket_rejected() -> None:
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deps._reset_sse_tickets()
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with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
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deps._redeem_sse_ticket("never-minted")
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assert exc.value.status_code == 401
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def test_expired_ticket_rejected() -> None:
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deps._reset_sse_tickets()
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# Mint, then jam the entry's expiry into the past so redeem fails closed.
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ticket = deps.mint_sse_ticket("user-1", "viewer")
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exp, identity = deps._sse_tickets[ticket]
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deps._sse_tickets[ticket] = (exp - deps._SSE_TICKET_TTL - 1, identity)
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with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
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deps._redeem_sse_ticket(ticket)
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assert exc.value.status_code == 401
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# ── endpoint round-trip ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_sse_ticket_endpoint_requires_auth(client: httpx.AsyncClient) -> None:
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resp = await client.post("/api/v1/auth/sse-ticket")
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assert resp.status_code == 401
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_sse_ticket_endpoint_mints_and_redeems(
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client: httpx.AsyncClient, auth_token: str
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) -> None:
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deps._reset_sse_tickets()
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resp = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/sse-ticket",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {auth_token}"},
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)
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assert resp.status_code == 200, resp.text
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body = resp.json()
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assert body["expires_in"] == 60
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ticket = body["ticket"]
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assert ticket and "." not in ticket # opaque, not a JWT
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# The minted ticket redeems to a bound identity exactly once.
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identity = deps._redeem_sse_ticket(ticket)
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assert "uuid" in identity and identity["role"] in ("admin", "viewer")
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def test_raw_jwt_in_sse_query_rejected() -> None:
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"""V3.1.1: a raw JWT is not a valid opaque ticket — _redeem_sse_ticket rejects
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any token that wasn't minted by mint_sse_ticket (unknown key → 401)."""
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deps._reset_sse_tickets()
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token = create_access_token({"uuid": "leaked", "jti": "x"})
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with pytest.raises(HTTPException) as exc:
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deps._redeem_sse_ticket(token)
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assert exc.value.status_code == 401
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# ── V2.1.3 change-password min length ────────────────────────────────────────
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@pytest.mark.anyio
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async def test_change_password_below_min_length_rejected(
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client: httpx.AsyncClient,
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) -> None:
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resp = await client.post("/api/v1/auth/login", json={
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"username": DECNET_ADMIN_USER, "password": DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD,
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})
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token = resp.json()["access_token"]
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# 11 chars — one below the 12-char floor. The request-validation layer
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# rejects the bad length before any auth/logic runs; DECNET's schema-guard
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# middleware surfaces length violations as 400 (not the raw 422).
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r = await client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/change-password",
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json={"old_password": DECNET_ADMIN_PASSWORD, "new_password": "short123456"},
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert r.status_code in (400, 422), r.text
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