fix(security): close MEDIUM ASVS findings — JWT pinning, SSE tickets, SSRF, mTLS pin, rate limits + correctness bugs

Auth (V2.1.1/V3.1.2, V2.1.3, V3.1.1):
- Pin JWT iss/aud/typ at mint and require+verify them at decode; revocation
  (jti denylist + tokens_valid_from) still enforced.
- Change-password now requires min_length=12.
- SSE auth moves off JWT-in-URL to a single-use 60s opaque ticket
  (POST /auth/sse-ticket); raw JWT in query no longer authenticates a stream.
  Removed dead fail-open get_stream_user helper.

Egress (V5.1.1, V9.1.1/V14.1.3):
- Webhook delivery + CRUD reject SSRF destinations (private/loopback/link-local/
  metadata, IPv4-mapped, multi-A-record) via resolved-IP validation, pin to the
  vetted IP, and never auto-follow redirects. Opt-out via DECNET_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE.
- UpdaterClient pins the worker leaf cert SHA-256 against the stored per-host
  fingerprint (fail closed on missing/mismatch); DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME now
  defaults True.

Hardening (V13.1.3, V4.1.4, V13.1.2):
- Rate-limit change-password (5/min), enroll-bundle (10/min), webhook-create
  (20/min), host-delete (20/min) via the existing slowapi limiter.
- Correct false 'global auth middleware' comment; document enroll-bundle proxy
  trust.

Correctness (BUG-7..11):
- BUG-7 unbound bus in finally; BUG-8 apply_ceiling clamps to min(base,ceiling);
  BUG-9 commit before emit; BUG-10 multi-actor rearm for sub-threshold identities;
  BUG-11 normalize naive timestamps to UTC.

Already-closed (no change): V14.1.1, V2.1.2/V3.1.3, V5.1.2. Tests added for
every fix; unanimous adversarial review.

decnet/web/router/__init__.py

@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter
 from .auth.api_login import router as login_router
 from .auth.api_change_pass import router as change_pass_router
 from .auth.api_logout import router as logout_router
+from .auth.api_sse_ticket import router as sse_ticket_router
 from .logs.api_get_logs import router as logs_router
 from .logs.api_get_histogram import router as histogram_router
 from .bounty.api_get_bounties import router as bounty_router
@@ -75,9 +76,12 @@ from .ttp.api_export_navigator import router as ttp_navigator_router
 from .ttp.api_get_groups_for_technique import router as ttp_groups_for_technique_router
 
 api_router = APIRouter(
-    # Every route under /api/v1 is auth-guarded (either by an explicit
-    # require_* Depends or by the global auth middleware). Document 401/403
-    # here so the OpenAPI schema reflects reality for contract tests.
+    # Auth is enforced PER ROUTE via explicit ``require_*`` Depends (see
+    # decnet.web.dependencies) — there is NO global auth middleware. A route
+    # without a require_* dependency is unauthenticated BY DESIGN; the only such
+    # routes are /health (liveness) and /auth/login (credential exchange).
+    # The 401/403 entries below are documented here so the OpenAPI schema
+    # reflects reality for contract tests, not because a middleware applies them.
     responses={
         400: {"description": "Malformed request body"},
         401: {"description": "Missing or invalid credentials"},
@@ -91,6 +95,7 @@ api_router = APIRouter(
 api_router.include_router(login_router)
 api_router.include_router(change_pass_router)
 api_router.include_router(logout_router)
+api_router.include_router(sse_ticket_router)
 
 # Logs & Analytics
 api_router.include_router(logs_router)