fix(security): close MEDIUM ASVS findings — JWT pinning, SSE tickets, SSRF, mTLS pin, rate limits + correctness bugs
Auth (V2.1.1/V3.1.2, V2.1.3, V3.1.1): - Pin JWT iss/aud/typ at mint and require+verify them at decode; revocation (jti denylist + tokens_valid_from) still enforced. - Change-password now requires min_length=12. - SSE auth moves off JWT-in-URL to a single-use 60s opaque ticket (POST /auth/sse-ticket); raw JWT in query no longer authenticates a stream. Removed dead fail-open get_stream_user helper. Egress (V5.1.1, V9.1.1/V14.1.3): - Webhook delivery + CRUD reject SSRF destinations (private/loopback/link-local/ metadata, IPv4-mapped, multi-A-record) via resolved-IP validation, pin to the vetted IP, and never auto-follow redirects. Opt-out via DECNET_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE. - UpdaterClient pins the worker leaf cert SHA-256 against the stored per-host fingerprint (fail closed on missing/mismatch); DECNET_VERIFY_HOSTNAME now defaults True. Hardening (V13.1.3, V4.1.4, V13.1.2): - Rate-limit change-password (5/min), enroll-bundle (10/min), webhook-create (20/min), host-delete (20/min) via the existing slowapi limiter. - Correct false 'global auth middleware' comment; document enroll-bundle proxy trust. Correctness (BUG-7..11): - BUG-7 unbound bus in finally; BUG-8 apply_ceiling clamps to min(base,ceiling); BUG-9 commit before emit; BUG-10 multi-actor rearm for sub-threshold identities; BUG-11 normalize naive timestamps to UTC. Already-closed (no change): V14.1.1, V2.1.2/V3.1.3, V5.1.2. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review.
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@@ -344,11 +344,11 @@ async def tick_multi_actor(
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for entry in candidates:
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identity_uuid = str(entry["identity_uuid"])
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primitives: list[str] = sorted(entry.get("primitives") or [])
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seen_now.add(identity_uuid)
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if len(primitives) < _T.MULTI_ACTOR_MIN_PRIMITIVES:
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# Repo already filters to >= 2 today; defensive against
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# future schema drift.
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continue
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seen_now.add(identity_uuid)
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signature = frozenset(primitives)
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if last_fired.get(identity_uuid) == signature:
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continue
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@@ -139,13 +139,20 @@ def record_fingerprint(
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"ts": ts.isoformat(),
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}
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if publish_fn is not None:
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publish_fn(_ROTATED_EVENT_TYPE, payload)
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if syslog_fn is not None:
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syslog_fn(_ROTATED_EVENT_TYPE, payload)
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session.commit()
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try:
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if publish_fn is not None:
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publish_fn(_ROTATED_EVENT_TYPE, payload)
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if syslog_fn is not None:
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syslog_fn(_ROTATED_EVENT_TYPE, payload)
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except Exception: # noqa: BLE001
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import logging as _logging
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_logging.getLogger(__name__).warning(
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"fingerprint_rotation: post-commit emit failed (state already durable)",
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exc_info=True,
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)
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return RotationOutcome(
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kind="rotated",
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old_hash=old_hash,
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
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import re
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from dataclasses import dataclass, field
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from datetime import datetime
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import Literal
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# RFC 5424 line structure
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@@ -159,6 +159,8 @@ def parse_line(line: str) -> LogEvent | None:
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timestamp = datetime.fromisoformat(ts_raw)
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except ValueError:
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return None
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if timestamp.tzinfo is None:
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timestamp = timestamp.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)
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fields = _parse_sd_params(sd_rest)
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if sd_rest.startswith("-"):
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