feat(ssh): capture password attempts via pam_exec auth-helper

Real OpenSSH doesn't log attempted passwords — only success/failure
with username — leaving SSH the sole auth-bearing service in the
fleet that contributes nothing to the cred corpus FTP/MySQL/RDP/
VNC/etc. populate. Closes that gap with a tiny pam_exec shim.

A static C helper (~80 LoC, musl, ~38KB stripped) is wired into
/etc/pam.d/sshd as `auth optional pam_exec.so expose_authtok stdout
/usr/sbin/auth-helper`. pam_exec writes the attempted password to
the helper's stdin NUL-terminated; the helper formats an RFC 5424
line in the exact shape templates/syslog_bridge.py produces
(facility local0, PEN 55555, MSGID auth_attempt — same MSGID FTP
uses) and writes it to /proc/1/fd/1 so the existing collector
stdout-reader pipeline picks it up.

Two password fields ride in the SD-block:
- password=     RFC 5424 escaped, ASCII-printable only, ? for non-
                printables. FTP-compatible — existing dashboard
                rendering picks up SSH attempts unchanged.
- password_b64= base64 of the exact PAM_AUTHTOK bytes. Preserves
                NUL/0xff/control-byte fingerprinting signal that the
                plain field necessarily drops.

Fail-open by design: the PAM line is `optional` so a malfunctioning
helper never blocks sshd auth. Better to miss a cred than break the
honeypot.

Verified end-to-end inside the rebuilt image:
- 38KB static ELF, runs without a dynamic linker
- correct RFC 5424 line for `hunter2` → b64 `aHVudGVyMg==`
- NUL truncation matches pam_exec's contract
- 0xff bytes survive losslessly through password_b64
- empty password produces a well-formed line (e.g. pubkey auth path)
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-25 04:42:50 -04:00
parent c69fdbb4ac
commit d064125f61
2 changed files with 197 additions and 0 deletions

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,17 @@
ARG BASE_IMAGE=debian:bookworm-slim
# ── Stage 1: build the static auth-helper credential-capture binary ──────────
# Compiled against musl so the resulting binary is fully static — runs on
# any glibc/musl Linux without a libc version match. Stripped at link
# time via -s so `file /usr/sbin/auth-helper` reports a generic ELF.
FROM debian:bookworm-slim AS auth-helper-build
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends musl-tools \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY auth-helper.c /tmp/auth-helper.c
RUN musl-gcc -static -O2 -s -Wall -Wextra \
-o /auth-helper /tmp/auth-helper.c
# ── Stage 2: the actual SSH decky image ──────────────────────────────────────
FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
@@ -57,6 +70,17 @@ RUN sed -i \
-e 's|^\$PrivDropToGroup|#$PrivDropToGroup|' \
/etc/rsyslog.conf
# auth-helper: drop the static binary into /usr/sbin and wire pam_exec
# into the sshd PAM stack so every password attempt (success or fail) is
# captured before pam_unix runs. `optional` so a malfunctioning helper
# never blocks auth — fail-open is correct: missed creds are recoverable,
# a borked honeypot is not. expose_authtok writes the password to the
# helper's stdin, NUL-terminated.
COPY --from=auth-helper-build /auth-helper /usr/sbin/auth-helper
RUN chmod 755 /usr/sbin/auth-helper && \
sed -i '1i auth optional pam_exec.so expose_authtok stdout /usr/sbin/auth-helper' \
/etc/pam.d/sshd
# Sudo: log to syslog (auth facility) AND a local file with full I/O capture
RUN echo 'Defaults logfile="/var/log/sudo.log"' >> /etc/sudoers && \
echo 'Defaults syslog=auth' >> /etc/sudoers && \

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,173 @@
/*
* auth-helper — RFC 5424 cred-capture helper invoked via pam_exec.so.
*
* Wired into /etc/pam.d/sshd as:
* auth optional pam_exec.so expose_authtok stdout /usr/sbin/auth-helper
*
* Behaviour:
* - Reads $PAM_USER and $PAM_RHOST from environ (set by pam_exec).
* - Reads PAM_AUTHTOK from stdin (NUL-terminated, written by pam_exec
* when invoked with `expose_authtok`).
* - Emits a single RFC 5424 line on /proc/1/fd/1 in the same shape as
* templates/syslog_bridge.py:syslog_line() — facility local0, PEN
* 55555, MSGID `auth_attempt` (matches FTP's existing event type so
* the parser + dashboard pick it up with zero changes).
*
* Two password fields ride in the SD-block:
* password RFC 5424-escaped ASCII-printable, '?' for non-printables.
* FTP-compatible; consumed by existing dashboard rendering.
* password_b64 base64 of the exact PAM_AUTHTOK bytes. Lossless.
* Preserves NUL/0xff/control bytes that the plain field
* would silently drop — useful fingerprinting signal.
*
* Fail-open: every error path silently exits 0. The PAM line is `optional`
* so a malfunctioning helper must never break sshd auth.
*
* PII discipline: the password value is attacker-supplied bytes. Decky
* services are not for admin SSH; throwaway creds (root:admin) are the
* convention. Limitations tracked in development/DEBT.md (DEBT-038).
*/
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#define MAX_USER 256
#define MAX_HOST 256
#define MAX_PW 1024
#define LINE_BUF 8192
static const char B64[] =
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
/* Standard base64 with '=' padding. NUL-terminates *out*. Returns bytes
* written (excluding the NUL). On overflow returns 0 and NUL-terminates. */
static size_t b64_encode(const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
char *out, size_t outcap) {
size_t i = 0, o = 0;
while (i + 3 <= inlen) {
if (o + 4 >= outcap) { out[0] = '\0'; return 0; }
unsigned x = ((unsigned)in[i] << 16) |
((unsigned)in[i+1] << 8) |
(unsigned)in[i+2];
out[o++] = B64[(x >> 18) & 0x3f];
out[o++] = B64[(x >> 12) & 0x3f];
out[o++] = B64[(x >> 6) & 0x3f];
out[o++] = B64[ x & 0x3f];
i += 3;
}
if (i < inlen) {
if (o + 4 >= outcap) { out[0] = '\0'; return 0; }
unsigned x = (unsigned)in[i] << 16;
if (i + 1 < inlen) x |= (unsigned)in[i+1] << 8;
out[o++] = B64[(x >> 18) & 0x3f];
out[o++] = B64[(x >> 12) & 0x3f];
out[o++] = (i + 1 < inlen) ? B64[(x >> 6) & 0x3f] : '=';
out[o++] = '=';
}
out[o] = '\0';
return o;
}
/* RFC 5424 §6.3.3: in SD-PARAM-VALUE, escape \\ → \\\\, " → \", ] → \].
* Non-printables become '?' so the line stays parser-safe. */
static size_t sd_escape(const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen,
char *out, size_t outcap) {
size_t o = 0;
for (size_t i = 0; i < inlen; i++) {
unsigned char c = in[i];
if (c == '\\' || c == '"' || c == ']') {
if (o + 3 >= outcap) break;
out[o++] = '\\';
out[o++] = c;
} else if (c >= 0x20 && c < 0x7f) {
if (o + 2 >= outcap) break;
out[o++] = c;
} else {
if (o + 2 >= outcap) break;
out[o++] = '?';
}
}
out[o] = '\0';
return o;
}
int main(void) {
const char *user = getenv("PAM_USER");
const char *rhost = getenv("PAM_RHOST");
if (!user) user = "";
if (!rhost) rhost = "";
/* Read password until NUL (pam_exec's expose_authtok contract) or EOF. */
unsigned char pw_raw[MAX_PW];
size_t pw_len = 0;
while (pw_len < sizeof(pw_raw)) {
ssize_t n = read(0, pw_raw + pw_len, sizeof(pw_raw) - pw_len);
if (n <= 0) break;
for (ssize_t i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if (pw_raw[pw_len + i] == 0) {
pw_len += (size_t)i;
goto pw_done;
}
}
pw_len += (size_t)n;
}
pw_done:;
/* Timestamp: YYYY-MM-DDThh:mm:ss.uuuuuu+00:00 — matches the shape
* datetime.now(timezone.utc).isoformat() emits in syslog_bridge.py. */
struct timespec ts;
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) != 0) return 0;
struct tm tm;
if (gmtime_r(&ts.tv_sec, &tm) == NULL) return 0;
char tsbuf[40];
snprintf(tsbuf, sizeof(tsbuf),
"%04d-%02d-%02dT%02d:%02d:%02d.%06ld+00:00",
tm.tm_year + 1900, tm.tm_mon + 1, tm.tm_mday,
tm.tm_hour, tm.tm_min, tm.tm_sec,
(long)(ts.tv_nsec / 1000));
char host[MAX_HOST];
if (gethostname(host, sizeof(host) - 1) != 0) {
host[0] = '-'; host[1] = '\0';
} else {
host[sizeof(host) - 1] = '\0';
}
/* Escape / encode the dynamic fields. Buffers sized 2x source to
* survive worst-case escape expansion. */
char user_esc [MAX_USER * 2];
char rhost_esc[MAX_HOST * 2];
char pw_esc [MAX_PW * 2];
char pw_b64 [MAX_PW * 2];
sd_escape((const unsigned char *)user, strlen(user), user_esc, sizeof(user_esc));
sd_escape((const unsigned char *)rhost, strlen(rhost), rhost_esc, sizeof(rhost_esc));
sd_escape(pw_raw, pw_len, pw_esc, sizeof(pw_esc));
b64_encode(pw_raw, pw_len, pw_b64, sizeof(pw_b64));
/* Priority: facility=local0(16), severity=INFO(6) → <16*8+6> = <134>.
* Matches the syslog_bridge.py default exactly. */
char line[LINE_BUF];
int n = snprintf(line, sizeof(line),
"<134>1 %s %s auth-helper - auth_attempt "
"[relay@55555 username=\"%s\" password=\"%s\" "
"password_b64=\"%s\" src_ip=\"%s\"]\n",
tsbuf, host, user_esc, pw_esc, pw_b64, rhost_esc);
if (n <= 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(line)) return 0;
/* /proc/1/fd/1 is the entrypoint's stdout — the fd Docker captures
* for `docker logs`. Same channel rsyslog forwards auth.* into via
* the existing template; we bypass rsyslog entirely so behaviour is
* deterministic across rsyslog config drift. */
int fd = open("/proc/1/fd/1", O_WRONLY | O_APPEND);
if (fd < 0) return 0;
ssize_t w = write(fd, line, (size_t)n);
(void)w;
close(fd);
return 0;
}