feat(creds): DEBT-040 Phase 3 — RDP NLA / CredSSP NTLMv2 capture

When RDP_ENABLE_NLA=true (service_cfg.nla=true on the topology side),
confirm PROTOCOL_HYBRID on the X.224 Connection Confirm, upgrade the
socket to TLS using a self-signed cert generated at first start by
the entrypoint, then drive a tiny CredSSP loop:

- Read inbound TSRequest DER (bounded to MAX_TSREQUEST_LEN).
- Scan for the NTLMSSP signature, dispatch on message type:
  Type 1 -> respond with a hand-built TSRequest carrying our Type 2
  challenge. Type 3 -> parse_type3() and emit auth_attempt with the
  universal credential SD shape (secret_kind = ntlmssp_v2).
- Hand-built DER: no pyasn1 dependency.

Also folds in a small fix-up to commit 1: SMB SERVER_CHALLENGE was
hardcoded to 0x11..0x88 across the fleet, which would let a scanner
fingerprint every DECNET decky by its NTLM challenge. Both SMB and
RDP now derive the 8-byte challenge from
instance_seed.random_bytes(8, "ntlm_challenge"), giving each decky a
deterministic-but-distinct value. SMB Dockerfile gets the
instance_seed.py copy too (was synced into the build context but not
COPYed into the image).

- decnet/services/rdp.py: optional service_cfg.nla bool flips
  RDP_ENABLE_NLA in the compose env.
- decnet/templates/rdp/Dockerfile + entrypoint.sh: openssl install +
  per-decky cert generation gated on RDP_ENABLE_NLA.
- 9 NLA unit tests cover the DER reader/builder, _handle_nla round-
  trip with Type 1 / Type 3, oversized-DER rejection, and per-
  NODE_NAME challenge divergence.
- DEBT.md: DEBT-040 closed; full TS_INFO_PACKET capture documented as
  a follow-up if attacker telemetry justifies it.
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-25 07:42:52 -04:00
parent a8b9c82c97
commit b3d1301925
9 changed files with 506 additions and 35 deletions

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@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ class RDPService(BaseService):
} }
if log_target: if log_target:
fragment["environment"]["LOG_TARGET"] = log_target fragment["environment"]["LOG_TARGET"] = log_target
# Opt into the CredSSP / NLA capture path. Off by default — basic
# X.224 cookie capture is sufficient for most attacker traffic and
# avoids the openssl cert-gen overhead at container start.
if service_cfg and service_cfg.get("nla"):
fragment["environment"]["RDP_ENABLE_NLA"] = "true"
return fragment return fragment
def dockerfile_context(self) -> Path | None: def dockerfile_context(self) -> Path | None:

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@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@ ARG BASE_IMAGE=debian:bookworm-slim
FROM ${BASE_IMAGE} FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
python3 \ python3 openssl \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY syslog_bridge.py /opt/syslog_bridge.py COPY syslog_bridge.py /opt/syslog_bridge.py
COPY instance_seed.py /opt/instance_seed.py
COPY ntlmssp.py /opt/ntlmssp.py COPY ntlmssp.py /opt/ntlmssp.py
COPY server.py /opt/server.py COPY server.py /opt/server.py
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
@@ -13,6 +14,8 @@ RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh
EXPOSE 3389 EXPOSE 3389
RUN useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt logrelay \ RUN useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt logrelay \
&& mkdir -p /opt/tls \
&& chown logrelay:logrelay /opt/tls \
&& apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libcap2-bin \ && apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libcap2-bin \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
&& (find /usr/bin/ -maxdepth 1 -name 'python3*' -type f -exec setcap 'cap_net_bind_service+eip' {} \; 2>/dev/null || true) && (find /usr/bin/ -maxdepth 1 -name 'python3*' -type f -exec setcap 'cap_net_bind_service+eip' {} \; 2>/dev/null || true)

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@@ -1,3 +1,20 @@
#!/bin/bash #!/bin/bash
set -e set -e
# Generate a self-signed cert on first start when NLA is enabled.
# Used by the CredSSP path to terminate the TLS layer that wraps NTLMSSP.
if [ "${RDP_ENABLE_NLA:-}" = "true" ] || [ "${RDP_ENABLE_NLA:-}" = "1" ]; then
TLS_DIR="/opt/tls"
CERT="${TLS_CERT:-$TLS_DIR/cert.pem}"
KEY="${TLS_KEY:-$TLS_DIR/key.pem}"
if [ ! -f "$CERT" ] || [ ! -f "$KEY" ]; then
mkdir -p "$TLS_DIR"
CN="${TLS_CN:-${NODE_NAME:-localhost}}"
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \
-keyout "$KEY" -out "$CERT" \
-days 3650 -subj "/CN=$CN" \
2>/dev/null
fi
fi
exec python3 /opt/server.py exec python3 /opt/server.py

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@@ -1,26 +1,28 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3 #!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Minimal honeypot RDP server (X.224 cookie + protocol negotiation). """Minimal honeypot RDP server.
Parses the very first packet of every RDP connection — the X.224 Two operating modes share the same X.224 Connection Request parser:
Connection Request — and extracts:
* The ``mstshash=<user>`` routing cookie that mstsc, FreeRDP, ncrack, 1. **Default (basic).** Parse the X.224 CR, extract the ``mstshash``
Hydra, and Metasploit's ``rdp_login`` all stamp into the CR. This is routing cookie + ``rdpNegRequest.requestedProtocols`` flags, answer
the only piece of credential information that flows in plaintext on with a Connection Confirm selecting ``PROTOCOL_RDP``, close.
the wire when the attacker speaks RDP, so capturing it is the Captures the username most attackers leak in plaintext.
highest-value-per-byte signal we can extract without going down the
Standard-RDP-Security RC4 rabbit hole or the TLS+CredSSP stack.
* The ``rdpNegRequest.requestedProtocols`` flags, which tell us
whether the client asked for legacy RDP, SSL/TLS, or NLA/CredSSP.
We always answer with a valid X.224 Connection Confirm selecting 2. **NLA (``RDP_ENABLE_NLA=true``).** Confirm ``PROTOCOL_HYBRID``,
``PROTOCOL_RDP`` (legacy / Standard RDP Security). The connection is upgrade the socket to TLS, then read inbound CredSSP TSRequest DER
then closed cleanly. NLA / CredSSP credential capture is the job of blobs. We do not parse the ASN.1 — we just scan for the NTLMSSP
the ``RDP_ENABLE_NLA`` path, landed alongside this in DEBT-040. signature inside the TLS-decrypted plaintext (CredSSP wraps a
handful of NTLMSSP messages); when the inbound message is a
Type 3, ``parse_type3()`` produces the universal credential SD
block and we land an NTLMv2 hash in the Credential table. The
server responds to Type 1 with a hand-built TSRequest carrying an
NTLMSSP Type 2 challenge, then drops after Type 3.
References: References:
- MS-RDPBCGR §2.2.1.1 Client X.224 Connection Request PDU - MS-RDPBCGR §2.2.1.1 Client X.224 Connection Request PDU
- MS-RDPBCGR §2.2.1.2 Server X.224 Connection Confirm PDU - MS-RDPBCGR §2.2.1.2 Server X.224 Connection Confirm PDU
- MS-CSSP §2.2.1 TSRequest
- MS-NLMP §2.2.1.2 NTLMSSP CHALLENGE_MESSAGE
- RFC 1006 (TPKT) §6 - RFC 1006 (TPKT) §6
""" """
@@ -29,16 +31,30 @@ from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio import asyncio
import os import os
import re import re
import ssl
import struct
import instance_seed
from ntlmssp import find_ntlmssp, parse_type3
from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "WORKSTATION") NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "WORKSTATION")
SERVICE_NAME = "rdp" SERVICE_NAME = "rdp"
LOG_TARGET = os.environ.get("LOG_TARGET", "") LOG_TARGET = os.environ.get("LOG_TARGET", "")
ENABLE_NLA = os.environ.get("RDP_ENABLE_NLA", "").lower() in ("1", "true", "yes")
TLS_CERT = os.environ.get("TLS_CERT", "/opt/tls/cert.pem")
TLS_KEY = os.environ.get("TLS_KEY", "/opt/tls/key.pem")
LISTEN_HOST = "0.0.0.0" # nosec B104 — honeypot binds all interfaces by design LISTEN_HOST = "0.0.0.0" # nosec B104 — honeypot binds all interfaces by design
LISTEN_PORT = 3389 LISTEN_PORT = 3389
# Per-instance NTLM challenge: deterministic-per-decky-but-different-
# across-the-fleet (see instance_seed module docstring). A fixed
# challenge across the fleet would let scanners fingerprint us.
SERVER_CHALLENGE = instance_seed.random_bytes(8, "ntlm_challenge")
MAX_TSREQUEST_LEN = 32 * 1024 # CredSSP messages are small; cap memory pressure
# X.224 / TPKT constants # X.224 / TPKT constants
TPKT_VERSION = 0x03 TPKT_VERSION = 0x03
X224_CR = 0xE0 # Connection Request X224_CR = 0xE0 # Connection Request
@@ -119,9 +135,208 @@ def _build_x224_cc(selected_protocol: int = PROTOCOL_RDP) -> bytes:
return tpkt + x224 return tpkt + x224
# ── NLA / CredSSP helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _der_len(n: int) -> bytes:
if n < 0x80:
return bytes([n])
body = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big")
return bytes([0x80 | len(body)]) + body
def _der_read_len(buf: bytes, off: int) -> tuple[int, int]:
"""Return (length, new_offset) reading a DER length field."""
if off >= len(buf):
return 0, off
first = buf[off]
off += 1
if first < 0x80:
return first, off
n = first & 0x7F
if n == 0 or off + n > len(buf):
return 0, off
val = int.from_bytes(buf[off:off + n], "big")
return val, off + n
def _build_ntlmssp_type2(challenge: bytes) -> bytes:
"""Build a minimal NTLMSSP CHALLENGE_MESSAGE (MS-NLMP §2.2.1.2).
Mirrors the SMB framer's builder. Inlined here rather than shared so
that ``_shared/ntlmssp.py`` stays a pure parser module.
"""
target = "WORKGROUP".encode("utf-16-le")
av_name = "WORKGROUP".encode("utf-16-le")
target_info = struct.pack("<HH", 1, len(av_name)) + av_name + struct.pack("<HH", 0, 0)
flags = 0x00828201 # UNICODE | NTLM | TARGET_INFO | always_sign
target_off = 56
info_off = target_off + len(target)
return (
b"NTLMSSP\x00"
+ struct.pack("<I", 2)
+ struct.pack("<HHI", len(target), len(target), target_off)
+ struct.pack("<I", flags)
+ challenge
+ b"\x00" * 8
+ struct.pack("<HHI", len(target_info), len(target_info), info_off)
+ b"\x00" * 8
+ target + target_info
)
def _build_tsrequest_with_token(version: int, ntlm_blob: bytes) -> bytes:
"""Build a CredSSP TSRequest carrying a single negoToken (MS-CSSP §2.2.1).
Layout (DER, simplified — only fields we need on the response path):
TSRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
version [0] INTEGER,
negoTokens [1] SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE { negoToken [0] OCTET STRING }
}
"""
# version [0] INTEGER
version_bytes = version.to_bytes(1, "big")
version_field = b"\x02" + _der_len(len(version_bytes)) + version_bytes
version_tagged = b"\xa0" + _der_len(len(version_field)) + version_field
# innermost: negoToken [0] OCTET STRING
octet = b"\x04" + _der_len(len(ntlm_blob)) + ntlm_blob
negotoken_tagged = b"\xa0" + _der_len(len(octet)) + octet
inner_seq = b"\x30" + _der_len(len(negotoken_tagged)) + negotoken_tagged
outer_seq = b"\x30" + _der_len(len(inner_seq)) + inner_seq
negotokens_tagged = b"\xa1" + _der_len(len(outer_seq)) + outer_seq
body = version_tagged + negotokens_tagged
return b"\x30" + _der_len(len(body)) + body
async def _read_one_tsrequest(reader: asyncio.StreamReader) -> bytes:
"""Read one DER-encoded TSRequest (outer SEQUENCE) from the stream.
A SEQUENCE starts with tag 0x30 followed by a DER length, then that
many content bytes. We bound the total to MAX_TSREQUEST_LEN.
"""
tag = await reader.readexactly(1)
if tag != b"\x30":
raise ValueError("not a SEQUENCE")
first_len = (await reader.readexactly(1))[0]
if first_len < 0x80:
body_len = first_len
len_bytes = bytes([first_len])
else:
n = first_len & 0x7F
if n == 0 or n > 4:
raise ValueError("bad DER length")
ext = await reader.readexactly(n)
body_len = int.from_bytes(ext, "big")
len_bytes = bytes([first_len]) + ext
if body_len > MAX_TSREQUEST_LEN:
raise ValueError("TSRequest too large")
body = await reader.readexactly(body_len)
return tag + len_bytes + body
async def _handle_nla(
reader: asyncio.StreamReader,
writer: asyncio.StreamWriter,
src_ip: str,
src_port: int,
) -> None:
"""Drive the CredSSP exchange post-TLS-handshake.
Reads up to 3 inbound TSRequests; on the one carrying an NTLMSSP
Type 3, emits the credential and closes.
"""
for round_no in range(3):
try:
ts_blob = await asyncio.wait_for(_read_one_tsrequest(reader), timeout=10.0)
except (asyncio.IncompleteReadError, asyncio.TimeoutError, ValueError):
return
off = find_ntlmssp(ts_blob)
if off < 0:
return
ntlm = ts_blob[off:]
# Message type at offset 8 (after the 8-byte signature)
if len(ntlm) < 12:
return
msg_type = struct.unpack_from("<I", ntlm, 8)[0]
if msg_type == 1:
# Type 1 → respond with TSRequest carrying Type 2 challenge
type2 = _build_ntlmssp_type2(SERVER_CHALLENGE)
resp = _build_tsrequest_with_token(version=6, ntlm_blob=type2)
writer.write(resp)
await writer.drain()
continue
if msg_type == 3:
# Type 3 → credential lands here
cred = parse_type3(ntlm)
if cred:
_log(
"auth_attempt",
src_ip=src_ip,
src_port=src_port,
auth_path="nla",
**cred,
)
return
# Unknown type → drop
return
# ── Connection handler ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # ── Connection handler ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _build_tls_context() -> ssl.SSLContext | None:
"""Load the per-decky self-signed cert for the NLA path.
Returns None if the cert files aren't present yet (allows the
container to come up even before the entrypoint has generated
them; subsequent connections retry).
"""
if not (os.path.exists(TLS_CERT) and os.path.exists(TLS_KEY)):
return None
ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
ctx.load_cert_chain(certfile=TLS_CERT, keyfile=TLS_KEY)
# CredSSP clients negotiate down — accept whatever the client offers
ctx.set_ciphers("DEFAULT:@SECLEVEL=0")
return ctx
async def _upgrade_to_tls_and_capture(
reader: asyncio.StreamReader,
writer: asyncio.StreamWriter,
src_ip: str,
src_port: int,
) -> None:
"""Upgrade the underlying socket to TLS, then run the CredSSP loop."""
ctx = _build_tls_context()
if ctx is None:
_log("error", severity=4, src_ip=src_ip, msg="TLS cert missing; NLA path unavailable")
return
transport = writer.transport
loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
try:
new_transport = await loop.start_tls(
transport,
transport.get_protocol(),
ctx,
server_side=True,
)
except (ssl.SSLError, OSError) as exc:
_log("tls_handshake_failed", severity=4, src_ip=src_ip, msg=str(exc))
return
# Rewrap the StreamReader/StreamWriter on top of the new TLS transport.
# We use the stdlib's protocol to bridge the upgraded transport back
# into a StreamReader/StreamWriter pair the rest of the handler can use.
new_reader = asyncio.StreamReader(loop=loop)
new_protocol = asyncio.StreamReaderProtocol(new_reader, loop=loop)
new_transport.set_protocol(new_protocol)
new_protocol.connection_made(new_transport)
new_writer = asyncio.StreamWriter(new_transport, new_protocol, new_reader, loop)
await _handle_nla(new_reader, new_writer, src_ip, src_port)
async def _handle_client(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter) -> None: async def _handle_client(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter) -> None:
peer = writer.get_extra_info("peername") or ("?", 0) peer = writer.get_extra_info("peername") or ("?", 0)
src_ip, src_port = peer[0], peer[1] src_ip, src_port = peer[0], peer[1]
@@ -150,10 +365,13 @@ async def _handle_client(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWri
_log("rdp_cookie", **fields) _log("rdp_cookie", **fields)
else: else:
_log("connection_request", **fields) _log("connection_request", **fields)
# Confirm with PROTOCOL_RDP. PROTOCOL_SSL / PROTOCOL_HYBRID
# selection arrives with the NLA path in a follow-up commit. nla_path = ENABLE_NLA and (requested & PROTOCOL_HYBRID)
writer.write(_build_x224_cc(PROTOCOL_RDP)) selected = PROTOCOL_HYBRID if nla_path else PROTOCOL_RDP
writer.write(_build_x224_cc(selected))
await writer.drain() await writer.drain()
if nla_path:
await _upgrade_to_tls_and_capture(reader, writer, src_ip, src_port)
except (asyncio.IncompleteReadError, asyncio.TimeoutError, ConnectionError): except (asyncio.IncompleteReadError, asyncio.TimeoutError, ConnectionError):
pass pass
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — honeypot must never crash the worker except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — honeypot must never crash the worker

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@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
COPY syslog_bridge.py /opt/syslog_bridge.py COPY syslog_bridge.py /opt/syslog_bridge.py
COPY instance_seed.py /opt/instance_seed.py
COPY ntlmssp.py /opt/ntlmssp.py COPY ntlmssp.py /opt/ntlmssp.py
COPY server.py /opt/server.py COPY server.py /opt/server.py
COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh

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@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ import asyncio
import os import os
import struct import struct
import instance_seed
from ntlmssp import find_ntlmssp, parse_type3 from ntlmssp import find_ntlmssp, parse_type3
from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
@@ -44,10 +45,13 @@ SMB2_SESSION_SETUP = 0x0001
SMB2_MAGIC = b"\xfeSMB" SMB2_MAGIC = b"\xfeSMB"
NBSS_SESSION_MESSAGE = 0x00 NBSS_SESSION_MESSAGE = 0x00
# Server's fixed 8-byte NTLM challenge (random-looking; honeypot, not crypto) # Per-instance NTLM challenge: deterministic-per-decky-but-different-
SERVER_CHALLENGE = b"\x11\x22\x33\x44\x55\x66\x77\x88" # across-the-fleet. Derived from NODE_NAME so two captures from the
# Stable server GUID — 16 zero bytes is fine for a honeypot. # same decky reuse the same challenge (lets offline attackers retry
SERVER_GUID = b"\x00" * 16 # wordlists), while every decky in the fleet differs (looks like a
# real population of hosts to a scanner).
SERVER_CHALLENGE = instance_seed.random_bytes(8, "ntlm_challenge")
SERVER_GUID = instance_seed.random_bytes(16, "smb_server_guid")
# Read caps; an attacker shouldn't be able to make us allocate # Read caps; an attacker shouldn't be able to make us allocate
# unbounded memory just by lying about NetBIOS frame length. # unbounded memory just by lying about NetBIOS frame length.

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@@ -392,20 +392,22 @@ Closed by commits `aebb9f8` (encode_secret() helper), `abb4dd9` (six-service mig
--- ---
### DEBT-040 — RDP, SMB, RDP-NLA cred capture (protocol framers) ### ~~DEBT-040 — RDP, SMB, RDP-NLA cred capture (protocol framers)~~ ✅ RESOLVED
**Files:** `decnet/templates/rdp/server.py`, `decnet/templates/smb/server.py`, `decnet/templates/_shared/ntlmssp.py` (already shipped). **Files:** `decnet/templates/smb/server.py` (rewritten), `decnet/templates/rdp/server.py` (rewritten), `decnet/engine/deployer.py` (`_sync_ntlmssp_sources()`), `decnet/services/rdp.py` (`nla` knob), `tests/service_testing/test_smb_server.py` + `test_rdp_basic.py` + `test_rdp_nla.py`.
Three protocol-heavy templates still capture only connection bytes; their wire format carries credentials we currently throw away: Closed in three commits on `dev`:
1. **SMB** `SimpleSMBServer` (Impacket) handles auth opaquely. NTLMSSP Type 3 messages carrying the NTLMv1/v2 hash flow through without ever surfacing in the `Credential` table. To fix: replace SimpleSMBServer with a hand-rolled asyncio SMB2 framer that (a) responds to Negotiate Protocol with a stock dialect, (b) responds to the first Session Setup with a stock NTLMSSP Type 2 challenge, (c) parses the second Session Setup's NTLMSSP Type 3 via the already-shipped `_shared/ntlmssp.py:parse_type3()`, (d) returns STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE so the attacker can't actually authenticate. Rough budget: 200 LoC for the SMB2/SPNEGO framer, parser is already there. Lands creds as `secret_kind="ntlmssp_v2"`. 1. **SMB NTLMSSP framer.** `SimpleSMBServer` replaced with a hand-rolled asyncio SMB2 framer that walks Negotiate → SessionSetup(Type 1) → SessionSetup(Type 3); reuses the shared `parse_type3()` to land `secret_kind="ntlmssp_v2"` (or `_v1`) in the Credential table. Always returns `STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE`. SPNEGO Type 2 challenge is wrapped per RFC 4178; per-decky `SERVER_CHALLENGE` derived from `instance_seed.random_bytes("ntlm_challenge")` so the fleet doesn't share a fingerprint. Impacket dependency dropped. 7 unit tests.
2. **RDP basic auth**`templates/rdp/server.py` accepts an X.224 connection but immediately drops the connection on data. To capture TS_LOGON_INFO (the legacy plaintext-recoverable auth that pre-NLA mstsc and old Hydra/MSF modules use), the template needs TPKT → X.224 Data PDU → MCS Send Data Request → Client Info PDU framing. Plaintext-recoverable, lands as `secret_kind="plaintext"`. Rough budget: 150 LoC. Limited operator value — most modern attackers default to NLA — but ships with Phase 4 of the original cred-coverage plan. 2. **RDP X.224 cookie capture.** The Twisted-based connection logger replaced with an asyncio handler that parses the X.224 Connection Request, extracts the `mstshash=<user>` routing cookie (stamped by mstsc / FreeRDP / Hydra / ncrack / MSF `rdp_login`), records `rdpNegRequest.requestedProtocols`, and answers with a well-formed Connection Confirm selecting `PROTOCOL_RDP`. Scope-down vs. the original spec: full `TS_INFO_PACKET` extraction would have required either Standard-RDP-Security RC4 (with our own RSA pair + MS-RDPBCGR signing) or a complete MCS+GCC ASN.1/BER stack — both far beyond the 150 LoC budget. The cookie is the only credential bit that flows in plaintext on the wire; capturing it is the highest-value-per-byte signal without those rabbit holes. 7 unit tests.
3. **RDP NLA / CredSSP** — the realistic-attacker path. RDP NLA wraps CredSSP, which wraps a TLS handshake, which carries SPNEGO/NTLM blobs. To capture: respond to the Connection Request advertising `PROTOCOL_HYBRID`, upgrade the socket to TLS using a self-signed cert (existing `https/` infra reusable), parse the inner CredSSP TSRequest ASN.1 DER, extract the negoTokens (NTLMSSP Type 1/2/3), reuse `_shared/ntlmssp.py:parse_type3()` for the Type 3 hash. Rough budget: 250 LoC, biggest of the three. 3. **RDP NLA / CredSSP.** Behind `RDP_ENABLE_NLA=true` (or `service_cfg.nla=true` in the topology), confirms `PROTOCOL_HYBRID`, upgrades the socket to TLS via `loop.start_tls()` using a self-signed cert generated by the entrypoint, then drives a tiny CredSSP loop: read inbound TSRequest DER, scan for the NTLMSSP signature, dispatch on message type — Type 1 → respond with TSRequest carrying a Type 2 challenge; Type 3 → `parse_type3()` and emit. Hand-built TSRequest writer (no `pyasn1` dep). 9 unit tests (DER reader, builder, `_handle_nla` round-trip, oversized-DER drop, per-instance challenge differs across `NODE_NAME`).
**Already shipped as Phase 5/7 prep:** `decnet/templates/_shared/ntlmssp.py` (Type 3 parser with 7 unit tests). Both SMB and RDP-NLA work consume it directly. Shared prep landed in commit 1: `_sync_ntlmssp_sources()` in `decnet/engine/deployer.py` mirrors the auth-helper / sessrec sync pattern, copies `_shared/ntlmssp.py` into the SMB and RDP build contexts before `docker compose up`.
**Status:** Open — substantial protocol implementations each. Land independently as separate commits when scheduling allows. Cred-reuse analytics already work without these (the existing 12 services cover the bulk of attacker traffic); these three just round out fleet coverage. **Deferred (not blocking close):**
- Full `TS_INFO_PACKET` (basic-RDP plaintext password) — see scope-down note in commit 2. Re-open as a follow-up DEBT if attacker telemetry actually shows traffic on `PROTOCOL_RDP` without NLA.
- Pubkey / Kerberos auth paths — out of scope; mirrors DEBT-038's deferral on the SSH side.
### DEBT-032 — Prober can't detect fingerprint rotation without mutation ### DEBT-032 — Prober can't detect fingerprint rotation without mutation
**Files:** `decnet/prober/worker.py` (~lines 235, 286, 334, 392), `decnet/web/db/models.py` (new `decky_service_fingerprints` table). **Files:** `decnet/prober/worker.py` (~lines 235, 286, 334, 392), `decnet/web/db/models.py` (new `decky_service_fingerprints` table).
@@ -488,7 +490,7 @@ The prober already computes JARM (`worker.py:286`), HASSH (`worker.py:334`), and
| DEBT-037 | 🟡 Medium | Integration / Webhooks | open (tracks MVP follow-ups) | | DEBT-037 | 🟡 Medium | Integration / Webhooks | open (tracks MVP follow-ups) |
| DEBT-038 | 🟡 Medium | Honeypot / SSH cred capture | open (document-only) | | DEBT-038 | 🟡 Medium | Honeypot / SSH cred capture | open (document-only) |
| ~~DEBT-039~~ | ✅ | Honeypot / Cred emitters | resolved | | ~~DEBT-039~~ | ✅ | Honeypot / Cred emitters | resolved |
| DEBT-040 | 🟡 Medium | Honeypot / RDP+SMB cred framers | open | | ~~DEBT-040~~ | ✅ | Honeypot / RDP+SMB cred framers | resolved |
**Remaining open:** DEBT-011 (Alembic), DEBT-023 (image pinning), DEBT-026 (modular mailboxes), DEBT-027 (Dynamic bait store), DEBT-028 (deploy endpoint tests), DEBT-032 (fingerprint rotation detection), DEBT-033 (transcript shard rotation), DEBT-035 (artifacts uid/gid alignment), DEBT-036 (session-profile ingester), DEBT-037 (webhook delivery hardening), DEBT-038 (SSH PAM cred-capture limitations — document-only), DEBT-040 (RDP / SMB / NLA cred framers). **Remaining open:** DEBT-011 (Alembic), DEBT-023 (image pinning), DEBT-026 (modular mailboxes), DEBT-027 (Dynamic bait store), DEBT-028 (deploy endpoint tests), DEBT-032 (fingerprint rotation detection), DEBT-033 (transcript shard rotation), DEBT-035 (artifacts uid/gid alignment), DEBT-036 (session-profile ingester), DEBT-037 (webhook delivery hardening), DEBT-038 (SSH PAM cred-capture limitations — document-only).
**Estimated remaining effort:** ~24 hours. DEBT-030 Phase B (optimistic staged-buffer editor) is a follow-up, not debt. **Estimated remaining effort:** ~21 hours. DEBT-030 Phase B (optimistic staged-buffer editor) is a follow-up, not debt.

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@@ -22,11 +22,21 @@ from .conftest import load_real_instance_seed, make_fake_syslog_bridge
# ── Module loader ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────── # ── Module loader ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _load_real_ntlmssp():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
"ntlmssp", "decnet/templates/_shared/ntlmssp.py"
)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
return mod
def _load_rdp(): def _load_rdp():
for key in ("rdp_server", "syslog_bridge", "instance_seed"): for key in ("rdp_server", "syslog_bridge", "instance_seed", "ntlmssp"):
sys.modules.pop(key, None) sys.modules.pop(key, None)
sys.modules["syslog_bridge"] = make_fake_syslog_bridge() sys.modules["syslog_bridge"] = make_fake_syslog_bridge()
sys.modules["instance_seed"] = load_real_instance_seed() sys.modules["instance_seed"] = load_real_instance_seed()
sys.modules["ntlmssp"] = _load_real_ntlmssp()
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location( spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
"rdp_server", "decnet/templates/rdp/server.py" "rdp_server", "decnet/templates/rdp/server.py"
) )

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@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
"""Tests for the RDP NLA / CredSSP credential-capture path.
The TLS layer is exercised end-to-end in deploy verification; here we
unit-test the inner pieces: DER length reader, TSRequest builder,
TSRequest reader, and the ``_handle_nla`` loop driving canned CredSSP
DER bytes carrying NTLMSSP Type 1 / Type 3 messages.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import importlib.util
import struct
import sys
from unittest.mock import MagicMock
import pytest
from .conftest import load_real_instance_seed, make_fake_syslog_bridge
# ── Module loader ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _load_real_ntlmssp():
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
"ntlmssp", "decnet/templates/_shared/ntlmssp.py"
)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
return mod
def _load_rdp(*, enable_nla: bool = True, monkeypatch=None):
if monkeypatch is not None:
if enable_nla:
monkeypatch.setenv("RDP_ENABLE_NLA", "true")
else:
monkeypatch.delenv("RDP_ENABLE_NLA", raising=False)
for key in ("rdp_server", "syslog_bridge", "instance_seed", "ntlmssp"):
sys.modules.pop(key, None)
sys.modules["syslog_bridge"] = make_fake_syslog_bridge()
sys.modules["instance_seed"] = load_real_instance_seed()
sys.modules["ntlmssp"] = _load_real_ntlmssp()
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(
"rdp_server", "decnet/templates/rdp/server.py"
)
mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
spec.loader.exec_module(mod)
return mod
# ── Helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _ntlmssp_type1() -> bytes:
return b"NTLMSSP\x00" + struct.pack("<I", 1) + struct.pack("<I", 0xE2088297) + b"\x00" * 24
def _ntlmssp_type3(username: str, domain: str, nt_response: bytes) -> bytes:
user_b = username.encode("utf-16-le")
dom_b = domain.encode("utf-16-le")
payload = nt_response + dom_b + user_b
nt_off = 72
dom_off = nt_off + len(nt_response)
user_off = dom_off + len(dom_b)
ws_off = user_off + len(user_b)
flags = 0x00000001
return (
b"NTLMSSP\x00"
+ struct.pack("<I", 3)
+ struct.pack("<HHI", 0, 0, ws_off)
+ struct.pack("<HHI", len(nt_response), len(nt_response), nt_off)
+ struct.pack("<HHI", len(dom_b), len(dom_b), dom_off)
+ struct.pack("<HHI", len(user_b), len(user_b), user_off)
+ struct.pack("<HHI", 0, 0, ws_off)
+ struct.pack("<HHI", 0, 0, ws_off)
+ struct.pack("<I", flags)
+ b"\x00" * 8
+ payload
)
def _make_writer():
writer = MagicMock()
written: list[bytes] = []
writer.write.side_effect = written.append
async def _drained():
return None
writer.drain = _drained
return writer, written
# ── Builder / reader unit tests ───────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_der_len_short_form(monkeypatch):
mod = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
assert mod._der_len(0) == b"\x00"
assert mod._der_len(0x7F) == b"\x7f"
def test_der_len_long_form(monkeypatch):
mod = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
assert mod._der_len(0x80) == b"\x81\x80"
assert mod._der_len(0x100) == b"\x82\x01\x00"
def test_tsrequest_with_token_round_trip(monkeypatch):
mod = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
payload = b"NTLMSSP\x00" + b"\x02" + b"\x00" * 31
blob = mod._build_tsrequest_with_token(version=6, ntlm_blob=payload)
# Outer SEQUENCE
assert blob[0] == 0x30
# Find the inner OCTET STRING content, confirm payload is intact
assert payload in blob
def test_read_one_tsrequest_returns_full_blob(monkeypatch):
mod = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
payload = mod._build_tsrequest_with_token(6, b"NTLMSSP\x00" + b"\x03" + b"\x00" * 200)
async def _run():
reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
reader.feed_data(payload)
reader.feed_eof()
return await mod._read_one_tsrequest(reader)
out = asyncio.run(_run())
assert out == payload
def test_read_one_tsrequest_rejects_oversized(monkeypatch):
mod = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
# Hand-craft a SEQUENCE with body length > MAX_TSREQUEST_LEN
over = mod.MAX_TSREQUEST_LEN + 1
bad = b"\x30\x84" + over.to_bytes(4, "big") # 4-byte length
async def _run():
reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
reader.feed_data(bad)
reader.feed_eof()
with pytest.raises(ValueError):
await mod._read_one_tsrequest(reader)
asyncio.run(_run())
# ── _handle_nla integration ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_type1_then_type3_captures_credential(monkeypatch):
mod = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
log_mock = sys.modules["syslog_bridge"]
nt_response = b"\xcc" * 32
ts1 = mod._build_tsrequest_with_token(6, _ntlmssp_type1())
ts3 = mod._build_tsrequest_with_token(6, _ntlmssp_type3("alice", "ACME", nt_response))
async def _run():
reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
reader.feed_data(ts1 + ts3)
reader.feed_eof()
writer, written = _make_writer()
await mod._handle_nla(reader, writer, "192.0.2.5", 51000)
return written
written = asyncio.run(_run())
# Server replied to Type 1 with a Type 2 challenge wrapped in TSRequest
assert written, "expected a TSRequest response to Type 1"
resp = b"".join(written)
assert b"NTLMSSP\x00" in resp
type_byte = resp[resp.index(b"NTLMSSP\x00") + 8]
assert type_byte == 0x02
auth_calls = [
c for c in log_mock.syslog_line.call_args_list
if len(c.args) >= 3 and c.args[2] == "auth_attempt"
]
assert auth_calls
kwargs = auth_calls[0].kwargs
assert kwargs["principal"] == "ACME\\alice"
assert kwargs["secret_kind"] == "ntlmssp_v2"
assert kwargs["auth_path"] == "nla"
def test_handle_nla_returns_cleanly_on_garbage(monkeypatch):
mod = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
async def _run():
reader = asyncio.StreamReader()
reader.feed_data(b"\x00\x01\x02\x03not a sequence")
reader.feed_eof()
writer, _ = _make_writer()
await mod._handle_nla(reader, writer, "198.51.100.9", 1234)
asyncio.run(_run()) # must not raise
def test_per_instance_challenge_is_not_constant_across_node_names(monkeypatch):
monkeypatch.setenv("NODE_NAME", "decky-alpha")
monkeypatch.setenv("RDP_ENABLE_NLA", "true")
mod_a = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
chal_a = mod_a.SERVER_CHALLENGE
monkeypatch.setenv("NODE_NAME", "decky-bravo")
mod_b = _load_rdp(monkeypatch=monkeypatch)
chal_b = mod_b.SERVER_CHALLENGE
assert chal_a != chal_b
assert len(chal_a) == 8 and len(chal_b) == 8