fix(auth): bulk-revoke sessions on password and role change

A stolen JWT used to survive a password reset for its full 24h. Now every
session-invalidating change moves the user's tokens_valid_from cutoff to
'now', so all of that user's prior tokens 401 on next use:

- self change-password, admin reset-password, role change all bump the
  cutoff (delete needs no bump: the row is gone, so the user lookup 401s).
- Cutoff is compared against the token's iat floored to whole seconds, so a
  re-login in the same second as the change isn't caught by its own
  revocation (the cost is a <=1s grey zone on same-second-old tokens).
- Per-user: changing one user never revokes another.
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-30 18:27:53 -04:00
parent c82897193e
commit 9fc489258b
4 changed files with 157 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@@ -195,8 +195,13 @@ async def _resolve_token(token: str) -> tuple[str, dict[str, Any]]:
if not jti:
raise _CREDENTIALS_EXCEPTION
# 2. Bulk cutoff: password/role change moves tokens_valid_from forward.
# JWT iat is whole-seconds, so floor the cutoff to whole seconds too —
# otherwise a re-login landing in the SAME second as the change gets an
# iat that truncates below a sub-second cutoff and is wrongly rejected.
# Cost: tokens issued earlier in that same second survive (≤1s), which is
# negligible against a 24h lifetime.
cutoff = user.get("tokens_valid_from")
if cutoff is not None and _epoch(payload.get("iat", 0)) < _epoch(cutoff):
if cutoff is not None and _epoch(payload.get("iat", 0)) < int(_epoch(cutoff)):
raise _CREDENTIALS_EXCEPTION
# 3. Single-token denylist (logout).
if await _is_revoked_cached(jti):

View File

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from typing import Any, Optional
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException, status
@@ -32,5 +33,8 @@ async def change_password(request: ChangePasswordRequest, current_user: str = De
_new_hash: str = await ahash_password(request.new_password)
await repo.update_user_password(current_user, _new_hash, must_change_password=False)
# Changing a password revokes every existing session for this user (incl.
# the current one): the caller's next request 401s and re-authenticates.
await repo.set_tokens_valid_from(current_user, datetime.now(timezone.utc))
invalidate_user_cache(current_user)
return {"message": "Password updated successfully"}

View File

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-or-later
import uuid as _uuid
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends, HTTPException
@@ -77,6 +78,8 @@ async def api_delete_user(
deleted = await repo.delete_user(user_uuid)
if not deleted:
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
# No token bump needed: the user row is gone, so _resolve_token already
# 401s any of their tokens (user lookup returns None).
invalidate_user_cache(user_uuid)
invalidate_list_users_cache()
return {"message": "User deleted"}
@@ -108,6 +111,9 @@ async def api_update_user_role(
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="User not found")
await repo.update_user_role(user_uuid, req.role)
# Revoke the target's sessions so a privilege change can't be outrun by an
# in-flight token carrying the old role.
await repo.set_tokens_valid_from(user_uuid, datetime.now(timezone.utc))
invalidate_user_cache(user_uuid)
invalidate_list_users_cache()
return {"message": "User role updated"}
@@ -140,6 +146,9 @@ async def api_reset_user_password(
await ahash_password(req.new_password),
must_change_password=True,
)
# Admin reset implies the old credential is burned — revoke the target's
# existing sessions so a leaked token can't survive the reset.
await repo.set_tokens_valid_from(user_uuid, datetime.now(timezone.utc))
invalidate_user_cache(user_uuid)
invalidate_list_users_cache()
return {"message": "Password reset successfully"}