merge: testing → main (reconcile 2-week divergence)

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2026-04-28 18:36:00 -04:00
parent 499836c9e4
commit 862e4dbb31
1235 changed files with 160255 additions and 7996 deletions

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#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Minimal honeypot SMB2 server.
Hand-rolled asyncio framer that does just enough of MS-SMB2 to lure a
client through Negotiate → Session Setup (Type1) → Session Setup
(Type3), at which point we extract the inner NTLMSSP Type 3 with the
shared :func:`ntlmssp.parse_type3` parser and emit a credential SD
block. Authentication always fails with STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE — the
attacker's hash lands in the Credential table; the attacker does not
land on the host.
References:
- MS-SMB2 §2.2.3 NEGOTIATE Request, §2.2.4 NEGOTIATE Response
- MS-SMB2 §2.2.5 SESSION_SETUP Request, §2.2.6 SESSION_SETUP Response
- MS-NLMP §2.2.1 NTLMSSP messages (CHALLENGE_MESSAGE Type 2)
- RFC 1002 §4.3 NetBIOS Session Service framing
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import asyncio
import os
import struct
import instance_seed
from ntlmssp import find_ntlmssp, parse_type3
from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "WORKSTATION")
SERVICE_NAME = "smb"
LOG_TARGET = os.environ.get("LOG_TARGET", "")
LISTEN_HOST = "0.0.0.0" # nosec B104 — honeypot binds all interfaces by design
LISTEN_PORT = 445
# SMB2 status codes
STATUS_SUCCESS = 0x00000000
STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED = 0xC0000016
STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE = 0xC000006D
# SMB2 commands
SMB2_NEGOTIATE = 0x0000
SMB2_SESSION_SETUP = 0x0001
SMB2_MAGIC = b"\xfeSMB"
NBSS_SESSION_MESSAGE = 0x00
# Per-instance NTLM challenge: deterministic-per-decky-but-different-
# across-the-fleet. Derived from NODE_NAME so two captures from the
# same decky reuse the same challenge (lets offline attackers retry
# wordlists), while every decky in the fleet differs (looks like a
# real population of hosts to a scanner).
SERVER_CHALLENGE = instance_seed.random_bytes(8, "ntlm_challenge")
SERVER_GUID = instance_seed.random_bytes(16, "smb_server_guid")
# Read caps; an attacker shouldn't be able to make us allocate
# unbounded memory just by lying about NetBIOS frame length.
MAX_NBSS_LEN = 1 * 1024 * 1024 # 1 MiB is plenty for SessionSetup blobs
def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
line = syslog_line(SERVICE_NAME, NODE_NAME, event_type, severity, **kwargs)
write_syslog_file(line)
forward_syslog(line, LOG_TARGET)
# ── SPNEGO / NTLMSSP Type 2 builder ──────────────────────────────────────────
def _build_ntlmssp_type2(challenge: bytes) -> bytes:
"""Build a minimal NTLMSSP CHALLENGE_MESSAGE (MS-NLMP §2.2.1.2).
Layout (all little-endian):
0 "NTLMSSP\\0" 8 bytes
8 MessageType=2 u32
12 TargetNameFields 8 bytes (Len, MaxLen, Offset)
20 NegotiateFlags u32
24 ServerChallenge 8 bytes
32 Reserved 8 bytes
40 TargetInfoFields 8 bytes
48 Version 8 bytes
56 Payload TargetName + TargetInfo
We advertise NEGOTIATE_UNICODE | NEGOTIATE_NTLM | NEGOTIATE_TARGET_INFO
(0x00828201) which is what real Windows servers send in practice; the
attacker's client uses these flags to decide whether to send Unicode
field strings in its Type 3 — the parser handles either.
"""
target = "WORKGROUP".encode("utf-16-le")
# AV pair list: NetBIOS computer name + EOL terminator
av_name = "WORKGROUP".encode("utf-16-le")
target_info = struct.pack("<HH", 1, len(av_name)) + av_name + struct.pack("<HH", 0, 0)
flags = 0x00828201 # UNICODE | NTLM | TARGET_INFO | always_sign
payload = target + target_info
target_off = 56
info_off = target_off + len(target)
return (
b"NTLMSSP\x00"
+ struct.pack("<I", 2) # Type 2
+ struct.pack("<HHI", len(target), len(target), target_off)
+ struct.pack("<I", flags)
+ challenge
+ b"\x00" * 8 # reserved
+ struct.pack("<HHI", len(target_info), len(target_info), info_off)
+ b"\x00" * 8 # version
+ payload
)
def _wrap_spnego_type2(ntlm_type2: bytes) -> bytes:
"""SPNEGO NegTokenResp DER carrying the NTLMSSP Type 2 blob.
Real Windows wraps Type 2 in an SPNEGO NegTokenResp (RFC 4178). A
well-formed wrapping is rarely required by attacker tools (Hydra,
Metasploit's smb_login, Impacket scanners all accept a raw Type 2
too) — but we ship the SPNEGO envelope so that finicky clients
don't bail out before sending Type 3, which is what we actually
want on the wire. The DER below hand-encodes a single
``NegTokenResp`` with negState=accept-incomplete, supportedMech =
NTLMSSP OID, and responseToken = ntlm_type2.
"""
# NTLMSSP OID = 1.3.6.1.4.1.311.2.2.10 → DER bytes
ntlmssp_oid = bytes.fromhex("06 0a 2b 06 01 04 01 82 37 02 02 0a".replace(" ", ""))
# negState [0] enum 1 (accept-incomplete)
neg_state = bytes.fromhex("a0 03 0a 01 01".replace(" ", ""))
# supportedMech [1] OID
supported = b"\xa1" + _der_len(len(ntlmssp_oid)) + ntlmssp_oid
# responseToken [2] OCTET STRING
rt_inner = b"\x04" + _der_len(len(ntlm_type2)) + ntlm_type2
response_token = b"\xa2" + _der_len(len(rt_inner)) + rt_inner
inner = neg_state + supported + response_token
neg_token_resp = b"\x30" + _der_len(len(inner)) + inner # SEQUENCE
# NegTokenResp is itself tagged [1] in the outer choice
return b"\xa1" + _der_len(len(neg_token_resp)) + neg_token_resp
def _der_len(n: int) -> bytes:
if n < 0x80:
return bytes([n])
body = n.to_bytes((n.bit_length() + 7) // 8, "big")
return bytes([0x80 | len(body)]) + body
# ── SMB2 PDU helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _smb2_header(command: int, status: int, message_id: int, session_id: int = 0) -> bytes:
"""SMB2 sync header (64 bytes), MS-SMB2 §2.2.1."""
return (
SMB2_MAGIC # ProtocolId
+ struct.pack("<H", 64) # StructureSize
+ struct.pack("<H", 0) # CreditCharge
+ struct.pack("<I", status) # Status
+ struct.pack("<H", command) # Command
+ struct.pack("<H", 1) # CreditResponse
+ struct.pack("<I", 0x00000001) # Flags = SERVER_TO_REDIR
+ struct.pack("<I", 0) # NextCommand
+ struct.pack("<Q", message_id) # MessageId
+ struct.pack("<I", 0) # Reserved (sync)
+ struct.pack("<I", 0) # TreeId
+ struct.pack("<Q", session_id) # SessionId
+ b"\x00" * 16 # Signature
)
def _negotiate_response(message_id: int) -> bytes:
"""SMB2 NEGOTIATE response (MS-SMB2 §2.2.4) — dialect 0x0210 (SMB 2.1)."""
body = (
struct.pack("<H", 65) # StructureSize
+ struct.pack("<H", 0) # SecurityMode
+ struct.pack("<H", 0x0210) # DialectRevision = SMB 2.1
+ struct.pack("<H", 0) # Reserved
+ SERVER_GUID
+ struct.pack("<I", 0) # Capabilities
+ struct.pack("<I", 0x00010000) # MaxTransactSize
+ struct.pack("<I", 0x00010000) # MaxReadSize
+ struct.pack("<I", 0x00010000) # MaxWriteSize
+ struct.pack("<Q", 0) # SystemTime
+ struct.pack("<Q", 0) # ServerStartTime
+ struct.pack("<H", 128) # SecurityBufferOffset (header64+body64)
+ struct.pack("<H", 0) # SecurityBufferLength
+ struct.pack("<I", 0) # Reserved2
)
return _smb2_header(SMB2_NEGOTIATE, STATUS_SUCCESS, message_id) + body
def _session_setup_response(message_id: int, session_id: int, sec_blob: bytes, status: int) -> bytes:
"""SMB2 SESSION_SETUP response (MS-SMB2 §2.2.6) carrying SPNEGO blob."""
body = (
struct.pack("<H", 9) # StructureSize
+ struct.pack("<H", 0) # SessionFlags
+ struct.pack("<H", 64 + 8) # SecurityBufferOffset
+ struct.pack("<H", len(sec_blob)) # SecurityBufferLength
)
return _smb2_header(SMB2_SESSION_SETUP, status, message_id, session_id) + body + sec_blob
# ── Connection handler ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async def _handle_client(reader: asyncio.StreamReader, writer: asyncio.StreamWriter) -> None:
peer = writer.get_extra_info("peername") or ("?", 0)
src_ip, src_port = peer[0], peer[1]
_log("connection", src_ip=src_ip, src_port=src_port)
session_id = 0x1000_0000_0000_0001
setup_round = 0
try:
while True:
# NetBIOS Session Service framing: 1 type byte + 3 length bytes
hdr = await reader.readexactly(4)
if hdr[0] != NBSS_SESSION_MESSAGE:
# Session Request / Keepalive / etc — quietly drop.
break
nb_len = int.from_bytes(hdr[1:4], "big")
if nb_len < 64 or nb_len > MAX_NBSS_LEN:
break
pdu = await reader.readexactly(nb_len)
if not pdu.startswith(SMB2_MAGIC):
# SMB1 Negotiate or other — not implemented; drop.
break
command = struct.unpack_from("<H", pdu, 12)[0]
message_id = struct.unpack_from("<Q", pdu, 24)[0]
if command == SMB2_NEGOTIATE:
resp = _negotiate_response(message_id)
_send_nbss(writer, resp)
elif command == SMB2_SESSION_SETUP:
setup_round += 1
# Body starts after 64-byte header; parse SecurityBufferOffset/Length
if len(pdu) < 64 + 24:
break
sec_off = struct.unpack_from("<H", pdu, 64 + 12)[0]
sec_len = struct.unpack_from("<H", pdu, 64 + 14)[0]
blob = pdu[sec_off:sec_off + sec_len] if sec_len else b""
if setup_round == 1:
# First Session Setup → respond with NTLMSSP Type 2
type2 = _build_ntlmssp_type2(SERVER_CHALLENGE)
spnego = _wrap_spnego_type2(type2)
resp = _session_setup_response(
message_id, session_id, spnego, STATUS_MORE_PROCESSING_REQUIRED
)
_send_nbss(writer, resp)
else:
# Second Session Setup → contains NTLMSSP Type 3
off = find_ntlmssp(blob)
if off >= 0:
cred = parse_type3(blob[off:])
if cred:
_log(
"auth_attempt",
src_ip=src_ip,
src_port=src_port,
**cred,
)
# Always fail authentication
resp = _session_setup_response(
message_id, session_id, b"", STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
)
_send_nbss(writer, resp)
break
else:
# We only implement Negotiate + SessionSetup; other commands
# could keep an attacker engaged longer but require state we
# don't carry. Disconnect.
break
except (asyncio.IncompleteReadError, ConnectionError):
pass
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 — honeypot must never crash the worker
_log("error", severity=4, src_ip=src_ip, msg=str(exc))
finally:
try:
writer.close()
await writer.wait_closed()
except Exception:
pass
_log("disconnect", src_ip=src_ip, src_port=src_port)
def _send_nbss(writer: asyncio.StreamWriter, smb_pdu: bytes) -> None:
nbss = bytes([NBSS_SESSION_MESSAGE]) + len(smb_pdu).to_bytes(3, "big")
writer.write(nbss + smb_pdu)
async def _main() -> None:
_log("startup", msg=f"SMB server starting as {NODE_NAME}")
server = await asyncio.start_server(_handle_client, LISTEN_HOST, LISTEN_PORT)
async with server:
await server.serve_forever()
if __name__ == "__main__":
try:
asyncio.run(_main())
except KeyboardInterrupt:
_log("shutdown")