merge: testing → main (reconcile 2-week divergence)
This commit is contained in:
24
decnet/templates/postgres/Dockerfile
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24
decnet/templates/postgres/Dockerfile
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
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ARG BASE_IMAGE=debian:bookworm-slim
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FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}
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RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
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python3 \
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&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
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COPY syslog_bridge.py /opt/syslog_bridge.py
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COPY instance_seed.py /opt/instance_seed.py
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COPY server.py /opt/server.py
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COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
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RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh
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EXPOSE 5432
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RUN useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt logrelay \
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&& apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libcap2-bin \
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&& rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
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&& (find /usr/bin/ -maxdepth 1 -name 'python3*' -type f -exec setcap 'cap_net_bind_service+eip' {} \; 2>/dev/null || true)
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HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
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CMD kill -0 1 || exit 1
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USER logrelay
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ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]
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3
decnet/templates/postgres/entrypoint.sh
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3
decnet/templates/postgres/entrypoint.sh
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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set -e
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exec python3 /opt/server.py
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120
decnet/templates/postgres/instance_seed.py
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120
decnet/templates/postgres/instance_seed.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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Per-instance stealth seeding for honeypot service templates.
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The whole decoy fleet looks identical to a scanner unless each decky
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diverges on the boring details: cluster UUIDs, auth salts, uptime, minor
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version strings, etc. This module derives a stable per-instance seed
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from NODE_NAME (+ optional INSTANCE_ID) and exposes helpers that return
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deterministic-per-decky-but-different-across-the-fleet values.
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Connection-time jitter is intentionally NOT seeded — two hits to the same
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decky should not replay the same latency curve.
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import asyncio
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import hashlib
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import os
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import random
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import time
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import uuid
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from typing import Sequence, TypeVar
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T = TypeVar("T")
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_HOSTNAME = (
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os.environ.get("NODE_NAME")
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or os.environ.get("HOSTNAME")
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or "decky"
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)
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_INSTANCE_ID = os.environ.get("INSTANCE_ID", "")
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_SEED_MATERIAL = f"{_HOSTNAME}:{_INSTANCE_ID}".encode()
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_SEED_INT = int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha256(_SEED_MATERIAL).digest()[:8], "big")
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#: Deterministic RNG seeded per decky — use for *persistent* choices
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#: (versions, UUIDs, stored credentials). Never use for timing.
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rng = random.Random(_SEED_INT)
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#: Process boot time — real uptime elapsed since container start.
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_PROCESS_START = time.time()
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#: Deterministic per-instance fake "has been up for this long at boot"
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#: offset, so every decky pretends to have a different history.
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_BOOT_OFFSET = rng.randint(3600, 45 * 86400)
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def hostname() -> str:
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return _HOSTNAME
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def uptime_seconds() -> int:
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"""Monotonically increasing, unique per instance."""
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return int(_BOOT_OFFSET + (time.time() - _PROCESS_START))
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def boot_epoch() -> int:
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"""Fake wall-clock boot time for this instance (seconds since epoch)."""
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return int(time.time() - uptime_seconds())
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def instance_uuid(namespace: str = "") -> str:
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"""Deterministic UUID4-looking value for this instance+namespace."""
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ns = uuid.UUID("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
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return str(uuid.uuid5(ns, f"{_HOSTNAME}:{namespace}"))
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def instance_hex(nbytes: int, namespace: str = "") -> str:
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"""Deterministic hex token of given byte length."""
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material = f"{_HOSTNAME}:{namespace}".encode()
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digest = hashlib.sha256(material).digest()
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while len(digest) < nbytes:
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digest += hashlib.sha256(digest).digest()
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return digest[:nbytes].hex()
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def pick(choices: Sequence[T]) -> T:
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"""Deterministic choice from a sequence."""
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return rng.choice(list(choices))
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def pick_weighted(choices: Sequence[tuple[T, float]]) -> T:
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"""Deterministic weighted choice. Input: [(item, weight), ...]."""
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total = sum(w for _, w in choices)
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r = rng.uniform(0, total)
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acc = 0.0
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for item, w in choices:
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acc += w
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if r <= acc:
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return item
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return choices[-1][0]
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def random_bytes(n: int, namespace: str = "") -> bytes:
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"""Deterministic per-instance byte string of length n."""
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out = bytearray()
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i = 0
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while len(out) < n:
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out.extend(
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hashlib.sha256(f"{_HOSTNAME}:{namespace}:{i}".encode()).digest()
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)
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i += 1
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return bytes(out[:n])
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def fresh_bytes(n: int) -> bytes:
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"""Non-deterministic random bytes — for per-connection nonces/salts."""
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return os.urandom(n)
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async def jitter(min_ms: int = 5, max_ms: int = 120) -> None:
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"""Async response-time jitter. Uses unseeded RNG so timing varies
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across connections to the same decky — seeded jitter would leak
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predictability."""
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await asyncio.sleep(random.uniform(min_ms, max_ms) / 1000.0)
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def jitter_sync(min_ms: int = 5, max_ms: int = 120) -> None:
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"""Blocking jitter for non-asyncio servers."""
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time.sleep(random.uniform(min_ms, max_ms) / 1000.0)
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181
decnet/templates/postgres/server.py
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181
decnet/templates/postgres/server.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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PostgreSQLserver.
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Reads the startup message, extracts username and database, responds with
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an AuthenticationMD5Password challenge, logs the hash sent back, then
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returns an error. Logs all interactions as JSON.
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"""
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import asyncio
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import os
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import struct
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import instance_seed as _seed
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import base64 as _base64
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from syslog_bridge import syslog_line, write_syslog_file, forward_syslog
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NODE_NAME = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "pgserver")
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SERVICE_NAME = "postgres"
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LOG_TARGET = os.environ.get("LOG_TARGET", "")
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PORT = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "5432"))
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# Per-instance list of "existing" databases. A real server knows which dbs
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# it hosts and returns SQLSTATE 3D000 "database does not exist" for anything
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# else — refusing with "password authentication failed" for every single
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# probe is a strong honeypot signal.
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_BASE_DBS = {"postgres", "template0", "template1"}
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_APP_DB_CHOICES = [
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["app", "app_prod"],
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["webapp", "sessions"],
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["erp", "erp_hist"],
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["django", "django_cache"],
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["rails_production"],
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["wordpress"],
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["gitlabhq_production"],
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["metrics", "grafana"],
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]
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_DATABASES = _BASE_DBS | set(_seed.pick(_APP_DB_CHOICES))
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def _error_response(severity: str, sqlstate: str, message: str) -> bytes:
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"""Wire-level PG ErrorResponse. Fields: S (localized severity), V
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(non-localized severity, PG 9.6+), C (SQLSTATE), M (message)."""
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body = (
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b"S" + severity.encode() + b"\x00"
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+ b"V" + severity.encode() + b"\x00"
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+ b"C" + sqlstate.encode() + b"\x00"
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+ b"M" + message.encode() + b"\x00"
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+ b"\x00"
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)
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return b"E" + struct.pack(">I", len(body) + 4) + body
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def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
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line = syslog_line(SERVICE_NAME, NODE_NAME, event_type, severity, **kwargs)
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write_syslog_file(line)
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forward_syslog(line, LOG_TARGET)
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class PostgresProtocol(asyncio.Protocol):
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def __init__(self):
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self._transport = None
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self._peer = None
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self._buf = b""
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self._state = "startup"
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def connection_made(self, transport):
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self._transport = transport
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self._peer = transport.get_extra_info("peername", ("?", 0))
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_log("connect", src=self._peer[0], src_port=self._peer[1])
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def data_received(self, data):
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self._buf += data
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self._process()
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def _process(self):
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if self._state == "startup":
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if len(self._buf) < 4:
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return
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msg_len = struct.unpack(">I", self._buf[:4])[0]
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if msg_len < 8 or msg_len > 10_000:
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self._transport.close()
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self._buf = b""
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return
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if len(self._buf) < msg_len:
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return
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msg = self._buf[:msg_len]
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self._buf = self._buf[msg_len:]
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self._handle_startup(msg)
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elif self._state == "auth":
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if len(self._buf) < 5:
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return
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msg_type = chr(self._buf[0])
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msg_len = struct.unpack(">I", self._buf[1:5])[0]
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if msg_len < 4 or msg_len > 10_000:
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self._transport.close()
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self._buf = b""
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return
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if len(self._buf) < msg_len + 1:
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return
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payload = self._buf[5:msg_len + 1]
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self._buf = self._buf[msg_len + 1:]
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if msg_type == "p":
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self._handle_password(payload)
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def _handle_startup(self, msg: bytes):
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# Startup message: length(4) + protocol_version(4) + params (key=value\0 pairs)
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if len(msg) < 8:
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return
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proto = struct.unpack(">I", msg[4:8])[0]
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if proto == 80877103: # SSL request
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self._transport.write(b"N") # reject SSL
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return
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params_raw = msg[8:].split(b"\x00")
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params = {}
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for i in range(0, len(params_raw) - 1, 2):
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k = params_raw[i].decode(errors="replace")
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v = params_raw[i + 1].decode(errors="replace") if i + 1 < len(params_raw) else ""
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if k:
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params[k] = v
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username = params.get("user", "")
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database = params.get("database", "") or username
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self._username = username
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self._database = database
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_log("startup", src=self._peer[0], username=username, database=database)
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# If the requested DB doesn't exist on this instance, real Postgres
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# rejects *before* asking for a password. Short-circuit so the decoy
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# matches that behavior and exposes the per-decky DB list.
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if database and database not in _DATABASES:
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msg = f'database "{database}" does not exist'
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self._transport.write(_error_response("FATAL", "3D000", msg))
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self._transport.close()
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return
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self._state = "auth"
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salt = os.urandom(4)
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auth_md5 = b"R" + struct.pack(">I", 12) + struct.pack(">I", 5) + salt
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self._transport.write(auth_md5)
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def _handle_password(self, payload: bytes):
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# Postgres MD5 challenge-response: the wire form is the literal
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# ASCII string "md5" + 32 hex chars (md5(md5(pw+user)+salt)).
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# Plaintext is unrecoverable, so we land this in the Credential
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# table as secret_kind="postgres_md5_challenge" — secret_b64
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# carries the raw hash bytes (after stripping the "md5" prefix
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# and hex-decoding) for content-addressable reuse within-kind.
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pw_hash = payload.rstrip(b"\x00").decode(errors="replace")
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_hex = pw_hash[3:] if pw_hash.startswith("md5") else pw_hash
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try:
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_raw = bytes.fromhex(_hex)
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except ValueError:
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_raw = _hex.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
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_b64 = _base64.b64encode(_raw).decode("ascii")
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_user = getattr(self, "_username", "")
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_log("auth", src=self._peer[0],
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username=_user, principal=_user,
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database=getattr(self, "_database", ""),
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pw_hash=pw_hash,
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secret_kind="postgres_md5_challenge",
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secret_printable=pw_hash,
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secret_b64=_b64)
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user = getattr(self, "_username", "")
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msg = f'password authentication failed for user "{user}"'
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_seed.jitter_sync(20, 90)
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self._transport.write(_error_response("FATAL", "28P01", msg))
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self._transport.close()
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def connection_lost(self, exc):
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_log("disconnect", src=self._peer[0] if self._peer else "?")
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async def main():
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_log("startup", msg=f"PostgreSQL server starting as {NODE_NAME}")
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loop = asyncio.get_running_loop()
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server = await loop.create_server(PostgresProtocol, "0.0.0.0", PORT) # nosec B104
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async with server:
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await server.serve_forever()
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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asyncio.run(main())
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261
decnet/templates/postgres/syslog_bridge.py
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261
decnet/templates/postgres/syslog_bridge.py
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@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
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#!/usr/bin/env python3
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"""
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Shared RFC 5424 syslog helper used by service containers.
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Services call syslog_line() to format an RFC 5424 message, then
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write_syslog_file() to emit it to stdout — the container runtime
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captures it, and the host-side collector streams it into the log file.
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RFC 5424 structure:
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<PRI>1 TIMESTAMP HOSTNAME APP-NAME PROCID MSGID [SD-ELEMENT] MSG
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Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
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"""
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import base64
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import re
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from datetime import datetime, timezone
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from typing import Any, Optional
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# ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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_FACILITY_LOCAL0 = 16
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_SD_ID = "relay@55555"
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_NILVALUE = "-"
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SEVERITY_EMERG = 0
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SEVERITY_ALERT = 1
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||||
SEVERITY_CRIT = 2
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||||
SEVERITY_ERROR = 3
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SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
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SEVERITY_NOTICE = 5
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SEVERITY_INFO = 6
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SEVERITY_DEBUG = 7
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_MAX_HOSTNAME = 255
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||||
_MAX_APPNAME = 48
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||||
_MAX_MSGID = 32
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# ─── Formatter ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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||||
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||||
def _sd_escape(value: str) -> str:
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||||
"""Escape SD-PARAM-VALUE per RFC 5424 §6.3.3."""
|
||||
return value.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"').replace("]", "\\]")
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def _sd_element(fields: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
|
||||
if not fields:
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||||
return _NILVALUE
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||||
params = " ".join(f'{k}="{_sd_escape(str(v))}"' for k, v in fields.items())
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||||
return f"[{_SD_ID} {params}]"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def syslog_line(
|
||||
service: str,
|
||||
hostname: str,
|
||||
event_type: str,
|
||||
severity: int = SEVERITY_INFO,
|
||||
timestamp: datetime | None = None,
|
||||
msg: str | None = None,
|
||||
**fields: Any,
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||||
) -> str:
|
||||
"""
|
||||
Return a single RFC 5424-compliant syslog line (no trailing newline).
|
||||
|
||||
Args:
|
||||
service: APP-NAME (e.g. "http", "mysql")
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||||
hostname: HOSTNAME (node name)
|
||||
event_type: MSGID (e.g. "request", "login_attempt")
|
||||
severity: Syslog severity integer (default: INFO=6)
|
||||
timestamp: UTC datetime; defaults to now
|
||||
msg: Optional free-text MSG
|
||||
**fields: Encoded as structured data params
|
||||
"""
|
||||
pri = f"<{_FACILITY_LOCAL0 * 8 + severity}>"
|
||||
ts = (timestamp or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).isoformat()
|
||||
host = (hostname or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_HOSTNAME]
|
||||
appname = (service or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_APPNAME]
|
||||
msgid = (event_type or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_MSGID]
|
||||
sd = _sd_element(fields)
|
||||
message = f" {msg}" if msg else ""
|
||||
return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
|
||||
"""Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
|
||||
into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
|
||||
|
||||
_log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
|
||||
|
||||
``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
|
||||
``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
|
||||
RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
|
||||
NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
|
||||
a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
|
||||
|
||||
The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
|
||||
being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
|
||||
cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"secret_printable": printable,
|
||||
"secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
"""Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
|
||||
``_log(...)`` call::
|
||||
|
||||
auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
|
||||
cred = classify_authorization(auth)
|
||||
if cred:
|
||||
_log("auth_attempt", **cred)
|
||||
|
||||
Recognised schemes:
|
||||
* Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
|
||||
``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
|
||||
* Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
|
||||
``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
|
||||
* Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
|
||||
``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
|
||||
Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
|
||||
ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
|
||||
secret from it.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
|
||||
if len(parts) < 2:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
|
||||
|
||||
if scheme == "basic":
|
||||
try:
|
||||
decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
|
||||
except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if ":" not in decoded:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"principal": user,
|
||||
"secret_kind": "plaintext",
|
||||
**encode_secret(pw),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"principal": None,
|
||||
"secret_kind": "http_bearer",
|
||||
**encode_secret(rest),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if scheme == "digest":
|
||||
params: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
|
||||
k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
|
||||
v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
|
||||
if k:
|
||||
params[k.lower()] = v
|
||||
response = params.get("response")
|
||||
if not response:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"principal": params.get("username"),
|
||||
"secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
|
||||
**encode_secret(response),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
_FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS = (
|
||||
"username", "user", "email", "login", "userid", "account",
|
||||
"log", # wp-login.php
|
||||
"user_login", # WordPress alt
|
||||
"uname", # phpMyAdmin
|
||||
"pma_username",
|
||||
)
|
||||
_FORM_SECRET_KEYS = (
|
||||
"password", "pass", "pwd", "passwd", "passwort", "mot_de_passe",
|
||||
"user_password", # WordPress alt
|
||||
"pma_password", # phpMyAdmin
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def extract_form_credentials(
|
||||
body: Optional[str],
|
||||
content_type: Optional[str],
|
||||
) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
|
||||
"""Parse an `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` body for credentials.
|
||||
|
||||
Returns the universal cred SD shape ready to spread into a
|
||||
``_log(...)`` call when both a principal-shaped key and a secret-
|
||||
shaped key are present in the body. Otherwise returns ``None``.
|
||||
|
||||
Field-name detection is case-insensitive and covers the most common
|
||||
login-form variants (WordPress wp-login.php, phpMyAdmin, Joomla,
|
||||
etc.). Add more entries to ``_FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS`` /
|
||||
``_FORM_SECRET_KEYS`` as new templates surface them.
|
||||
"""
|
||||
if not body or not isinstance(content_type, str):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
if not content_type.lower().startswith("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"):
|
||||
return None
|
||||
|
||||
fields: dict[str, str] = {}
|
||||
for pair in body.split("&"):
|
||||
if "=" not in pair:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
k, _, v = pair.partition("=")
|
||||
# urllib decode without importing urllib at module scope (the
|
||||
# template emitters are import-cost-sensitive). Inline the
|
||||
# tiny percent-decode + plus-decode.
|
||||
try:
|
||||
from urllib.parse import unquote_plus
|
||||
key = unquote_plus(k).lower()
|
||||
val = unquote_plus(v)
|
||||
except Exception:
|
||||
continue
|
||||
# First-wins so duplicate-key forms don't get clobbered.
|
||||
fields.setdefault(key, val)
|
||||
|
||||
principal: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
for k in _FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS:
|
||||
if k in fields:
|
||||
principal = fields[k]
|
||||
break
|
||||
secret: Optional[str] = None
|
||||
for k in _FORM_SECRET_KEYS:
|
||||
if k in fields:
|
||||
secret = fields[k]
|
||||
break
|
||||
if secret is None:
|
||||
return None
|
||||
return {
|
||||
"principal": principal,
|
||||
"secret_kind": "plaintext",
|
||||
**encode_secret(secret),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
|
||||
print(line, flush=True)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
def forward_syslog(line: str, log_target: str) -> None:
|
||||
"""No-op stub. TCP forwarding is handled by rsyslog, not by service containers."""
|
||||
pass
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user