merge: testing → main (reconcile 2-week divergence)

decnet/templates/https/Dockerfile

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+ARG BASE_IMAGE=debian:bookworm-slim
+FROM ${BASE_IMAGE}
+
+RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
+    python3 python3-pip openssl \
+    && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
+
+ENV PIP_BREAK_SYSTEM_PACKAGES=1
+RUN pip3 install --no-cache-dir flask jinja2
+
+COPY syslog_bridge.py /opt/syslog_bridge.py
+COPY instance_seed.py /opt/instance_seed.py
+COPY server.py /opt/server.py
+COPY entrypoint.sh /entrypoint.sh
+RUN chmod +x /entrypoint.sh
+
+RUN mkdir -p /opt/tls
+
+EXPOSE 443
+RUN useradd -r -s /bin/false -d /opt logrelay \
+ && chown -R logrelay:logrelay /opt/tls \
+ && apt-get update && apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends libcap2-bin \
+ && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/* \
+ && (find /usr/bin/ -maxdepth 1 -name 'python3*' -type f -exec setcap 'cap_net_bind_service+eip' {} \; 2>/dev/null || true)
+
+HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=5s --start-period=10s --retries=3 \
+  CMD kill -0 1 || exit 1
+
+USER logrelay
+ENTRYPOINT ["/entrypoint.sh"]

decnet/templates/https/entrypoint.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+set -e
+
+TLS_DIR="/opt/tls"
+CERT="${TLS_CERT:-$TLS_DIR/cert.pem}"
+KEY="${TLS_KEY:-$TLS_DIR/key.pem}"
+
+# Generate a self-signed certificate if none exists
+if [ ! -f "$CERT" ] || [ ! -f "$KEY" ]; then
+    mkdir -p "$TLS_DIR"
+    CN="${TLS_CN:-${NODE_NAME:-localhost}}"
+    openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -nodes \
+        -keyout "$KEY" -out "$CERT" \
+        -days 3650 -subj "/CN=$CN" \
+        2>/dev/null
+fi
+
+exec python3 /opt/server.py

decnet/templates/https/instance_seed.py

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Per-instance stealth seeding for honeypot service templates.
+
+The whole decoy fleet looks identical to a scanner unless each decky
+diverges on the boring details: cluster UUIDs, auth salts, uptime, minor
+version strings, etc. This module derives a stable per-instance seed
+from NODE_NAME (+ optional INSTANCE_ID) and exposes helpers that return
+deterministic-per-decky-but-different-across-the-fleet values.
+
+Connection-time jitter is intentionally NOT seeded — two hits to the same
+decky should not replay the same latency curve.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import asyncio
+import hashlib
+import os
+import random
+import time
+import uuid
+from typing import Sequence, TypeVar
+
+T = TypeVar("T")
+
+_HOSTNAME = (
+    os.environ.get("NODE_NAME")
+    or os.environ.get("HOSTNAME")
+    or "decky"
+)
+_INSTANCE_ID = os.environ.get("INSTANCE_ID", "")
+_SEED_MATERIAL = f"{_HOSTNAME}:{_INSTANCE_ID}".encode()
+_SEED_INT = int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha256(_SEED_MATERIAL).digest()[:8], "big")
+
+#: Deterministic RNG seeded per decky — use for *persistent* choices
+#: (versions, UUIDs, stored credentials). Never use for timing.
+rng = random.Random(_SEED_INT)
+
+#: Process boot time — real uptime elapsed since container start.
+_PROCESS_START = time.time()
+
+#: Deterministic per-instance fake "has been up for this long at boot"
+#: offset, so every decky pretends to have a different history.
+_BOOT_OFFSET = rng.randint(3600, 45 * 86400)
+
+
+def hostname() -> str:
+    return _HOSTNAME
+
+
+def uptime_seconds() -> int:
+    """Monotonically increasing, unique per instance."""
+    return int(_BOOT_OFFSET + (time.time() - _PROCESS_START))
+
+
+def boot_epoch() -> int:
+    """Fake wall-clock boot time for this instance (seconds since epoch)."""
+    return int(time.time() - uptime_seconds())
+
+
+def instance_uuid(namespace: str = "") -> str:
+    """Deterministic UUID4-looking value for this instance+namespace."""
+    ns = uuid.UUID("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000")
+    return str(uuid.uuid5(ns, f"{_HOSTNAME}:{namespace}"))
+
+
+def instance_hex(nbytes: int, namespace: str = "") -> str:
+    """Deterministic hex token of given byte length."""
+    material = f"{_HOSTNAME}:{namespace}".encode()
+    digest = hashlib.sha256(material).digest()
+    while len(digest) < nbytes:
+        digest += hashlib.sha256(digest).digest()
+    return digest[:nbytes].hex()
+
+
+def pick(choices: Sequence[T]) -> T:
+    """Deterministic choice from a sequence."""
+    return rng.choice(list(choices))
+
+
+def pick_weighted(choices: Sequence[tuple[T, float]]) -> T:
+    """Deterministic weighted choice. Input: [(item, weight), ...]."""
+    total = sum(w for _, w in choices)
+    r = rng.uniform(0, total)
+    acc = 0.0
+    for item, w in choices:
+        acc += w
+        if r <= acc:
+            return item
+    return choices[-1][0]
+
+
+def random_bytes(n: int, namespace: str = "") -> bytes:
+    """Deterministic per-instance byte string of length n."""
+    out = bytearray()
+    i = 0
+    while len(out) < n:
+        out.extend(
+            hashlib.sha256(f"{_HOSTNAME}:{namespace}:{i}".encode()).digest()
+        )
+        i += 1
+    return bytes(out[:n])
+
+
+def fresh_bytes(n: int) -> bytes:
+    """Non-deterministic random bytes — for per-connection nonces/salts."""
+    return os.urandom(n)
+
+
+async def jitter(min_ms: int = 5, max_ms: int = 120) -> None:
+    """Async response-time jitter. Uses unseeded RNG so timing varies
+    across connections to the same decky — seeded jitter would leak
+    predictability."""
+    await asyncio.sleep(random.uniform(min_ms, max_ms) / 1000.0)
+
+
+def jitter_sync(min_ms: int = 5, max_ms: int = 120) -> None:
+    """Blocking jitter for non-asyncio servers."""
+    time.sleep(random.uniform(min_ms, max_ms) / 1000.0)

decnet/templates/https/server.py

@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+HTTPS service emulator using Flask + TLS.
+Identical to the HTTP honeypot but wrapped in TLS. Accepts all requests,
+logs every detail (method, path, headers, body, TLS info), and responds
+with configurable pages. Forwards events as JSON to LOG_TARGET if set.
+"""
+
+import json
+import logging
+import os
+import ssl
+from pathlib import Path
+
+from flask import Flask, request, send_from_directory
+from werkzeug.serving import make_server, WSGIRequestHandler
+
+import instance_seed as _seed
+from syslog_bridge import (
+    classify_authorization,
+    extract_form_credentials,
+    forward_syslog,
+    syslog_line,
+    write_syslog_file,
+)
+
+logging.getLogger("werkzeug").setLevel(logging.ERROR)
+
+NODE_NAME     = os.environ.get("NODE_NAME", "webserver")
+SERVICE_NAME   = "https"
+LOG_TARGET    = os.environ.get("LOG_TARGET", "")
+PORT          = int(os.environ.get("PORT", "443"))
+
+_SERVER_CHOICES = [
+    "Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)",
+    "Apache/2.4.52 (Ubuntu)",
+    "Apache/2.4.54 (Debian)",
+    "Apache/2.4.56 (Debian)",
+    "Apache/2.4.57 (Debian)",
+    "Apache/2.4.58 (Ubuntu)",
+    "Apache/2.4.59 (Debian)",
+    "nginx/1.18.0 (Ubuntu)",
+    "nginx/1.22.1",
+    "nginx/1.24.0 (Ubuntu)",
+    "nginx/1.25.3",
+]
+SERVER_HEADER = os.environ.get("SERVER_HEADER") or _seed.pick(_SERVER_CHOICES)
+RESPONSE_CODE = int(os.environ.get("RESPONSE_CODE", "403"))
+FAKE_APP      = os.environ.get("FAKE_APP", "")
+EXTRA_HEADERS = json.loads(os.environ.get("EXTRA_HEADERS", "{}"))
+CUSTOM_BODY   = os.environ.get("CUSTOM_BODY", "")
+FILES_DIR     = os.environ.get("FILES_DIR", "")
+TLS_CERT      = os.environ.get("TLS_CERT", "/opt/tls/cert.pem")
+TLS_KEY       = os.environ.get("TLS_KEY", "/opt/tls/key.pem")
+
+_FAKE_APP_BODIES: dict[str, str] = {
+    "apache_default": (
+        "<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC \"-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN\">\n"
+        "<html><head><title>Apache2 Debian Default Page</title></head>\n"
+        "<body><h1>Apache2 Debian Default Page</h1>\n"
+        "<p>It works!</p></body></html>"
+    ),
+    "nginx_default": (
+        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>Welcome to nginx!</title></head>\n"
+        "<body><h1>Welcome to nginx!</h1>\n"
+        "<p>If you see this page, the nginx web server is successfully installed.</p>\n"
+        "</body></html>"
+    ),
+    "wordpress": (
+        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>WordPress &rsaquo; Error</title></head>\n"
+        "<body id=\"error-page\"><div class=\"wp-die-message\">\n"
+        "<h1>Error establishing a database connection</h1></div></body></html>"
+    ),
+    "phpmyadmin": (
+        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>phpMyAdmin</title></head>\n"
+        "<body><form method=\"post\" action=\"index.php\">\n"
+        "<input type=\"text\" name=\"pma_username\" />\n"
+        "<input type=\"password\" name=\"pma_password\" />\n"
+        "<input type=\"submit\" value=\"Go\" /></form></body></html>"
+    ),
+    "iis_default": (
+        "<!DOCTYPE html><html><head><title>IIS Windows Server</title></head>\n"
+        "<body><h1>IIS Windows Server</h1>\n"
+        "<p>Welcome to Internet Information Services</p></body></html>"
+    ),
+}
+
+app = Flask(__name__)
+
+@app.after_request
+def _fix_server_header(response):
+    response.headers["Server"] = SERVER_HEADER
+    return response
+
+def _log(event_type: str, severity: int = 6, **kwargs) -> None:
+    line = syslog_line(SERVICE_NAME, NODE_NAME, event_type, severity, **kwargs)
+    write_syslog_file(line)
+    forward_syslog(line, LOG_TARGET)
+
+
+@app.before_request
+def log_request():
+    body = request.get_data(as_text=True)[:4096]
+    cred = (
+        classify_authorization(request.headers.get("Authorization"))
+        or extract_form_credentials(body, request.headers.get("Content-Type"))
+    )
+    _log(
+        "request",
+        method=request.method,
+        path=request.path,
+        remote_addr=request.remote_addr,
+        headers=dict(request.headers),
+        body=body[:512],
+        **(cred or {}),
+    )
+
+
+@app.route("/", defaults={"path": ""})
+@app.route("/<path:path>", methods=["GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH", "OPTIONS", "HEAD"])
+def catch_all(path):
+    # Serve static files directory if configured
+    if FILES_DIR and path:
+        files_path = Path(FILES_DIR) / path
+        if files_path.is_file():
+            return send_from_directory(FILES_DIR, path)
+
+    # Select response body: custom > fake_app preset > default 403
+    if CUSTOM_BODY:
+        body = CUSTOM_BODY
+    elif FAKE_APP and FAKE_APP in _FAKE_APP_BODIES:
+        body = _FAKE_APP_BODIES[FAKE_APP]
+    else:
+        body = (
+            "<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC \"-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN\">\n"
+            "<html><head>\n"
+            "<title>403 Forbidden</title>\n"
+            "</head><body>\n"
+            "<h1>Forbidden</h1>\n"
+            "<p>You don't have permission to access this resource.</p>\n"
+            "<hr>\n"
+            f"<address>{SERVER_HEADER} Server at {NODE_NAME} Port 443</address>\n"
+            "</body></html>\n"
+        )
+
+    headers = {"Content-Type": "text/html", **EXTRA_HEADERS}
+    return body, RESPONSE_CODE, headers
+
+
+class _SilentHandler(WSGIRequestHandler):
+    """Suppress Werkzeug's Server header so Flask's after_request is the sole source."""
+    def version_string(self) -> str:
+        return ""
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    _log("startup", msg=f"HTTPS server starting as {NODE_NAME}")
+
+    ctx = ssl.SSLContext(ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS_SERVER)
+    ctx.load_cert_chain(TLS_CERT, TLS_KEY)
+
+    srv = make_server("0.0.0.0", PORT, app, request_handler=_SilentHandler)  # nosec B104
+    srv.socket = ctx.wrap_socket(srv.socket, server_side=True)
+    srv.serve_forever()

decnet/templates/https/syslog_bridge.py

@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""
+Shared RFC 5424 syslog helper used by service containers.
+
+Services call syslog_line() to format an RFC 5424 message, then
+write_syslog_file() to emit it to stdout — the container runtime
+captures it, and the host-side collector streams it into the log file.
+
+RFC 5424 structure:
+  <PRI>1 TIMESTAMP HOSTNAME APP-NAME PROCID MSGID [SD-ELEMENT] MSG
+
+Facility: local0 (16). SD element ID uses PEN 55555.
+"""
+
+import base64
+import re
+from datetime import datetime, timezone
+from typing import Any, Optional
+
+# ─── Constants ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+_FACILITY_LOCAL0 = 16
+_SD_ID = "relay@55555"
+_NILVALUE = "-"
+
+SEVERITY_EMERG   = 0
+SEVERITY_ALERT   = 1
+SEVERITY_CRIT    = 2
+SEVERITY_ERROR   = 3
+SEVERITY_WARNING = 4
+SEVERITY_NOTICE  = 5
+SEVERITY_INFO    = 6
+SEVERITY_DEBUG   = 7
+
+_MAX_HOSTNAME = 255
+_MAX_APPNAME  = 48
+_MAX_MSGID    = 32
+
+# ─── Formatter ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+
+def _sd_escape(value: str) -> str:
+    """Escape SD-PARAM-VALUE per RFC 5424 §6.3.3."""
+    return value.replace("\\", "\\\\").replace('"', '\\"').replace("]", "\\]")
+
+
+def _sd_element(fields: dict[str, Any]) -> str:
+    if not fields:
+        return _NILVALUE
+    params = " ".join(f'{k}="{_sd_escape(str(v))}"' for k, v in fields.items())
+    return f"[{_SD_ID} {params}]"
+
+
+def syslog_line(
+    service: str,
+    hostname: str,
+    event_type: str,
+    severity: int = SEVERITY_INFO,
+    timestamp: datetime | None = None,
+    msg: str | None = None,
+    **fields: Any,
+) -> str:
+    """
+    Return a single RFC 5424-compliant syslog line (no trailing newline).
+
+    Args:
+        service:    APP-NAME (e.g. "http", "mysql")
+        hostname:   HOSTNAME (node name)
+        event_type: MSGID    (e.g. "request", "login_attempt")
+        severity:   Syslog severity integer (default: INFO=6)
+        timestamp:  UTC datetime; defaults to now
+        msg:        Optional free-text MSG
+        **fields:   Encoded as structured data params
+    """
+    pri     = f"<{_FACILITY_LOCAL0 * 8 + severity}>"
+    ts      = (timestamp or datetime.now(timezone.utc)).isoformat()
+    host    = (hostname or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_HOSTNAME]
+    appname = (service  or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_APPNAME]
+    msgid   = (event_type or _NILVALUE)[:_MAX_MSGID]
+    sd      = _sd_element(fields)
+    message = f" {msg}" if msg else ""
+    return f"{pri}1 {ts} {host} {appname} {_NILVALUE} {msgid} {sd}{message}"
+
+
+def encode_secret(secret: str) -> dict[str, str]:
+    """Standardized credential-secret encoding for the universal SD-block shape.
+
+    Returns ``{'secret_printable': ..., 'secret_b64': ...}`` ready to spread
+    into a :func:`syslog_line` / ``_log`` call::
+
+        _log("auth_attempt", principal=user, **encode_secret(password))
+
+    ``secret_printable`` mirrors auth-helper.c's sd_escape: bytes outside
+    ``[0x20, 0x7f)`` collapse to ``'?'`` so the field is always parser-safe
+    RFC 5424 ASCII. ``secret_b64`` preserves the *original* utf-8 bytes —
+    NUL/0xff/control/non-utf8 sequences all survive losslessly, useful as
+    a fingerprinting signal even when the printable form sanitizes them.
+
+    The decnet web ingester's native-shape branch keys off ``secret_b64``
+    being present, so any service emitter calling this helper lands its
+    cred attempt directly in the :class:`Credential` table.
+    """
+    raw = secret.encode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+    printable = "".join(chr(b) if 0x20 <= b < 0x7f else "?" for b in raw)
+    return {
+        "secret_printable": printable,
+        "secret_b64": base64.b64encode(raw).decode("ascii"),
+    }
+
+
+_DIGEST_PARAM_RE = re.compile(r'(\w+)\s*=\s*"([^"]*)"|(\w+)\s*=\s*([^,\s]+)')
+
+
+def classify_authorization(header_value: Optional[str]) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an HTTP Authorization header value into Credential SD fields.
+
+    Returns a dict with the universal cred shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call::
+
+        auth = request.headers.get("Authorization")
+        cred = classify_authorization(auth)
+        if cred:
+            _log("auth_attempt", **cred)
+
+    Recognised schemes:
+      * Basic — base64(user:pw); decoded → ``principal=user`` +
+        ``secret_kind="plaintext"`` + ``encode_secret(pw)``.
+      * Bearer / Token — opaque token; ``principal=None`` +
+        ``secret_kind="http_bearer"`` + ``encode_secret(token)``.
+      * Digest — ``principal=username`` from header +
+        ``secret_kind="http_digest_md5"`` + ``encode_secret(response)``.
+
+    Returns ``None`` for anything unrecognized (AWS4-HMAC-SHA256, NTLM,
+    Negotiate, …) — callers can still log the raw header value in the
+    ambient SD-block; we just don't know how to extract a hashable
+    secret from it.
+    """
+    if not header_value or not isinstance(header_value, str):
+        return None
+    parts = header_value.strip().split(None, 1)
+    if len(parts) < 2:
+        return None
+    scheme, rest = parts[0].lower(), parts[1].strip()
+
+    if scheme == "basic":
+        try:
+            decoded = base64.b64decode(rest, validate=True).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
+        except (ValueError, base64.binascii.Error):
+            return None
+        if ":" not in decoded:
+            return None
+        user, _, pw = decoded.partition(":")
+        return {
+            "principal": user,
+            "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+            **encode_secret(pw),
+        }
+
+    if scheme in ("bearer", "token"):
+        return {
+            "principal": None,
+            "secret_kind": "http_bearer",
+            **encode_secret(rest),
+        }
+
+    if scheme == "digest":
+        params: dict[str, str] = {}
+        for m in _DIGEST_PARAM_RE.finditer(rest):
+            k = m.group(1) or m.group(3)
+            v = m.group(2) if m.group(2) is not None else m.group(4)
+            if k:
+                params[k.lower()] = v
+        response = params.get("response")
+        if not response:
+            return None
+        return {
+            "principal": params.get("username"),
+            "secret_kind": "http_digest_md5",
+            **encode_secret(response),
+        }
+
+    return None
+
+
+_FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS = (
+    "username", "user", "email", "login", "userid", "account",
+    "log",        # wp-login.php
+    "user_login", # WordPress alt
+    "uname",      # phpMyAdmin
+    "pma_username",
+)
+_FORM_SECRET_KEYS = (
+    "password", "pass", "pwd", "passwd", "passwort", "mot_de_passe",
+    "user_password",   # WordPress alt
+    "pma_password",    # phpMyAdmin
+)
+
+
+def extract_form_credentials(
+    body: Optional[str],
+    content_type: Optional[str],
+) -> Optional[dict[str, Any]]:
+    """Parse an `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` body for credentials.
+
+    Returns the universal cred SD shape ready to spread into a
+    ``_log(...)`` call when both a principal-shaped key and a secret-
+    shaped key are present in the body. Otherwise returns ``None``.
+
+    Field-name detection is case-insensitive and covers the most common
+    login-form variants (WordPress wp-login.php, phpMyAdmin, Joomla,
+    etc.). Add more entries to ``_FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS`` /
+    ``_FORM_SECRET_KEYS`` as new templates surface them.
+    """
+    if not body or not isinstance(content_type, str):
+        return None
+    if not content_type.lower().startswith("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"):
+        return None
+
+    fields: dict[str, str] = {}
+    for pair in body.split("&"):
+        if "=" not in pair:
+            continue
+        k, _, v = pair.partition("=")
+        # urllib decode without importing urllib at module scope (the
+        # template emitters are import-cost-sensitive). Inline the
+        # tiny percent-decode + plus-decode.
+        try:
+            from urllib.parse import unquote_plus
+            key = unquote_plus(k).lower()
+            val = unquote_plus(v)
+        except Exception:
+            continue
+        # First-wins so duplicate-key forms don't get clobbered.
+        fields.setdefault(key, val)
+
+    principal: Optional[str] = None
+    for k in _FORM_PRINCIPAL_KEYS:
+        if k in fields:
+            principal = fields[k]
+            break
+    secret: Optional[str] = None
+    for k in _FORM_SECRET_KEYS:
+        if k in fields:
+            secret = fields[k]
+            break
+    if secret is None:
+        return None
+    return {
+        "principal": principal,
+        "secret_kind": "plaintext",
+        **encode_secret(secret),
+    }
+
+
+def write_syslog_file(line: str) -> None:
+    """Emit a syslog line to stdout for container log capture."""
+    print(line, flush=True)
+
+
+def forward_syslog(line: str, log_target: str) -> None:
+    """No-op stub. TCP forwarding is handled by rsyslog, not by service containers."""
+    pass