fix(creds): MQTT regression + secret_kind for hash credentials
Honest correction to the "every cred-emitting service" claim. Audit
of templates/* found three gaps:
1. MQTT — was working through the legacy adapter, silently dropped
when Phase 3 (e696c2b) deleted it. Now migrated to encode_secret()
alongside the others.
2. Postgres — `auth, pw_hash=…` event captures the MD5
challenge-response the attacker sent. Plaintext irrecoverable, so
it never fit the (principal, secret_b64=raw_bytes) shape. Lands
in Credential as secret_kind="postgres_md5_challenge".
3. VNC — `auth_response, response=…hex` event captures the 16-byte
DES-encrypted challenge. Same situation as Postgres: plaintext
irrecoverable. Lands as secret_kind="vnc_des_response".
Adds a `secret_kind` discriminator column to Credential (default
"plaintext", indexed). The dedup tuple gains secret_kind so two
credentials with the same sha256 but different kinds are
fundamentally different rows — different challenges produce
different bytes for the same plaintext password, so cross-kind
reuse matches are meaningless and would only confuse analytics.
The model now genuinely covers every cred-emitting service in the
fleet:
plaintext SSH, Telnet, FTP, POP3, IMAP, SMTP, Redis, LDAP,
MQTT
postgres_md5_* Postgres
vnc_des_response VNC
Username-only services (MySQL/MSSQL — TDS pre-encryption captures
the user but never sees the password byte) intentionally don't feed
Credential — they're recon signals, not cred attempts.
40 tests pass in the touched scope. New cases: secret_kind dedups
independently in the repo; Postgres MD5 + VNC DES emitters thread
through; MQTT round-trips through the native branch.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -72,7 +72,22 @@ class Credential(SQLModel, table=True):
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decky_name: str = Field(index=True)
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service: str = Field(index=True)
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principal: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, index=True, max_length=256)
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# Universal lossless secret representations.
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# Discriminator for what `secret_b64` actually contains. Default
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# ``"plaintext"`` — a recoverable password the attacker sent on the
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# wire (SSH/Telnet/FTP/IMAP/POP3/SMTP/Redis/LDAP/MQTT). Other kinds:
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# ``"postgres_md5_challenge"`` (md5(md5(pw+user)+salt) hex bytes
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# the attacker sent in the Postgres password message — plaintext
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# irrecoverable), ``"vnc_des_response"`` (16-byte DES-encrypted
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# challenge response — same shape).
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#
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# Reuse semantics gracefully degrade: same secret_sha256 only
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# correlates within a single ``secret_kind``. Cross-kind matches
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# are meaningless because different challenges produce different
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# bytes for the same plaintext password.
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secret_kind: str = Field(default="plaintext", index=True, max_length=32)
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# Universal lossless secret representations. For non-plaintext
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# kinds, secret_b64 is base64 of the raw attacker-sent bytes (after
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# hex-decode for protocols that ship the response as a hex string).
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secret_sha256: str = Field(index=True, max_length=64)
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secret_b64: Optional[str] = Field(default=None, max_length=2048)
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# Best-effort printable form — non-printable bytes collapsed to '?'
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@@ -557,11 +557,13 @@ class SQLModelRepository(BaseRepository):
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payload["fields"] = json.dumps(payload["fields"], ensure_ascii=True)
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principal = payload.get("principal")
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secret_kind = payload.get("secret_kind") or "plaintext"
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async with self._session() as session:
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stmt = select(Credential).where(
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Credential.attacker_ip == payload["attacker_ip"],
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Credential.decky_name == payload["decky_name"],
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Credential.service == payload["service"],
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Credential.secret_kind == secret_kind,
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Credential.secret_sha256 == payload["secret_sha256"],
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# NULL == NULL is False under SQL — branch the predicate.
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(Credential.principal == principal) if principal is not None
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@@ -582,6 +584,7 @@ class SQLModelRepository(BaseRepository):
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decky_name=payload["decky_name"],
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service=payload["service"],
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principal=principal,
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secret_kind=secret_kind,
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secret_sha256=payload["secret_sha256"],
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secret_b64=payload.get("secret_b64"),
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secret_printable=payload.get("secret_printable"),
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