fix(security): close LOW ASVS findings — env bypass, SSE/deployment authz, CN fail-close, password byte-limit, exception leaks, BUG-12..16
Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5): - env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env; gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest). - must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint. - GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size). - CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating. Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16): - Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed, ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'. - Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError). Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2): - Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop, blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0. Correctness (BUG-12..16): - BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry, consistent principal_key canonicalization). - BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop). - BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick). - BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise. - BUG-16 see above. Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk + documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
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@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ from fastapi import APIRouter, Depends
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from pydantic import BaseModel
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from decnet.web.db.repository import BaseRepository
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from decnet.web.dependencies import get_repo
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from decnet.web.dependencies import get_repo, require_viewer
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router = APIRouter()
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@@ -24,9 +24,15 @@ class DeploymentModeResponse(BaseModel):
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swarm_host_count: int
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# Auth-gated (V4.1.6): the response leaks host role + enrolled-worker count,
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# which is recon-useful to an unauthenticated attacker. The dashboard only ever
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# calls this from inside the post-login app shell (App.tsx gates the whole app
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# behind a valid token), so there is no pre-auth UI-mode use case to preserve —
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# gate the entire endpoint behind require_viewer rather than splitting it.
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@router.get("/deployment-mode", response_model=DeploymentModeResponse)
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async def get_deployment_mode(
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repo: BaseRepository = Depends(get_repo),
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_user: dict = Depends(require_viewer),
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) -> DeploymentModeResponse:
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role = os.environ.get("DECNET_MODE", "master").lower()
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hosts = 0
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