fix(security): close LOW ASVS findings — env bypass, SSE/deployment authz, CN fail-close, password byte-limit, exception leaks, BUG-12..16
Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5): - env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env; gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest). - must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint. - GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size). - CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating. Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16): - Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed, ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'. - Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError). Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2): - Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop, blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0. Correctness (BUG-12..16): - BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry, consistent principal_key canonicalization). - BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop). - BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick). - BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise. - BUG-16 see above. Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk + documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix; unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
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@@ -145,23 +145,26 @@ async def put_llm_config(
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try:
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from decnet.web.db.secrets import encrypt_secret
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merged["api_key_ciphertext"] = encrypt_secret(str(api_key_raw))
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except RuntimeError as exc:
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except RuntimeError:
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log.exception("api.realism.put_llm: secret encryption unavailable")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=500,
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detail=f"Secret encryption unavailable: {exc}",
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) from exc
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detail="Secret encryption unavailable; check server configuration.",
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) from None
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try:
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cfg = LLMConfig(**merged)
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except Exception as exc:
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=str(exc)) from exc
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log.warning("api.realism.put_llm: LLMConfig validation failed: %s", exc)
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raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid LLM configuration payload.") from exc
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try:
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llm_config.apply(cfg)
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except Exception as exc:
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except Exception:
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log.exception("api.realism.put_llm: backend init failed")
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raise HTTPException(
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status_code=400, detail=f"Backend init failed: {exc}"
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) from exc
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status_code=400, detail="Backend init failed; check provider/model settings."
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) from None
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await repo.set_realism_config(_CONFIG_KEY, json.dumps(merged))
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_hydrated = True
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