fix(security): close LOW ASVS findings — env bypass, SSE/deployment authz, CN fail-close, password byte-limit, exception leaks, BUG-12..16

Auth/session (V2.1.7, V4.1.5, V4.1.6, V2.1.4/V2.1.5):
- env secret validation no longer bypassed by attacker-injectable PYTEST* env;
  gated on explicit DECNET_TESTING=1 (set only in conftest).
- must_change_password now enforced on the SSE header-JWT path, not just ticket mint.
- GET /system/deployment-mode requires viewer auth (was leaking role + topology size).
- CreateUser/ResetUser passwords min_length=12; passwords >72 bytes rejected
  explicitly instead of bcrypt silently truncating.

Swarm ingestion (V9.1.3, BUG-16):
- Log listener hard-rejects peers with unparseable/empty cert CN (fail closed,
  ingests nothing) instead of tagging 'unknown'.
- Shutdown handlers no longer swallow real errors (narrowed to CancelledError).

Info leakage (V7.1.2, V14.1.2):
- Exception text sanitized on swarm-update, health, tarpit, realism, file-drop,
  blank-topology endpoints (raw tc/docker stderr, DB/Docker errors logged
  server-side, generic detail returned). pyproject license corrected to AGPL-3.0.

Correctness (BUG-12..16):
- BUG-12 atomic credential upsert (UNIQUE constraint + IntegrityError retry,
  consistent principal_key canonicalization).
- BUG-13 rule-tail watermark uses >= with seen-id dedup (no same-second drop).
- BUG-14 worker wake cleared before wait (no lost wake during tick).
- BUG-15 intel gather tolerates an unexpected provider raise.
- BUG-16 see above.

Already-closed (verified, no change): V2.1.6, V5.1.3, V9.1.2. Accept-risk +
documented: V2.1.8 cache window, V3.1.3 idle timeout. Tests added for every fix;
unanimous adversarial review after two refute-fix rounds.
This commit is contained in:
2026-06-10 13:27:14 -04:00
parent d80e6aa6d1
commit 245975a6dd
40 changed files with 1629 additions and 72 deletions

View File

@@ -62,8 +62,10 @@ async def _check_database_cached() -> ComponentHealth:
try:
await repo.get_total_logs()
_db_component = ComponentHealth(status="ok")
except Exception as exc:
_db_component = ComponentHealth(status="failing", detail=str(exc))
except Exception:
import logging as _logging
_logging.getLogger("api.get_health").exception("database liveness check failed")
_db_component = ComponentHealth(status="failing", detail="database unavailable")
_db_last_check = time.monotonic()
return _db_component
@@ -95,7 +97,7 @@ async def get_health(user: dict = Depends(require_viewer)) -> Any:
detail = "cancelled"
else:
exc = task.exception()
detail = f"exited: {exc}" if exc else "exited unexpectedly"
detail = "exited unexpectedly" if not exc else "exited with error"
components[name] = ComponentHealth(status="failing", detail=detail)
else:
components[name] = ComponentHealth(status="ok")
@@ -112,10 +114,12 @@ async def get_health(user: dict = Depends(require_viewer)) -> Any:
await asyncio.to_thread(_docker_client.ping) # type: ignore[union-attr]
_docker_healthy = True
_docker_detail = ""
except Exception as exc:
except Exception:
import logging as _logging
_logging.getLogger("api.get_health").exception("docker daemon ping failed")
_docker_client = None
_docker_healthy = False
_docker_detail = str(exc)
_docker_detail = "docker daemon unavailable"
_docker_last_check = now
if _docker_healthy: